Informed but opinionated commentary and analysis on urban transportation topics from the Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal. Names have been omitted to protect the guilty.

Our Mission: Monkeywrench the Anti-Transit Forces

 
TOKYO -- Tokyo Monorail (aka "Tokyo-Haneda") -- PART TWO (Monorail 15)

From the Cabalmaster:

As outlined previously, the Tokyo Monorail was built as a full-scale private-sector venture, without any government or airline-industry investment. However, after the1964 Olympics were over, the line became unprofitable and had to be rescued by supplier Hitachi. Airport traffic grew steadily, and new stations were added gradually to serve on-line development. The Monorail became profitable in 1972, and resumed "independent" operation as Tokyo Monorail Co, Ltd, in 1981. Hitachi Transportation Systems remained the sole shareholder until very recently.

Traffic at Haneda Airport grew from 3.9 million in 1965 to 49.3 million in 1997, despite relocation of nearly all international flights to Narita Airport in 1978. By this time, Haneda was the world's sixth busiest airport. Annual Monorail traffic grew from three million to more than 60 million per year during the same period. The line enjoyed a 60 percent market share of airport traffic for many years, but plans for airport expansion finally attracted the attention of Keikyu management.

In 1983, the Transport Ministry began a project to expand Haneda Airport's capacity from 22 million to 85 million passengers annually. New terminals were built 2.5 km east of the original. The Monorail company built a 3.2-mile extension to the new terminal. This opened in 1993, and the 0.6-mile section to the old terminal was closed at the same time. The new tunnels beneath the runways were built by the government and leased to the Monorail company for an annual payment of 2.5 percent of appraised value. The extension cost about $880 million in today's dollars. Fifteen percent was paid by the central government. The remainder was financed by loans, with interest subsidized by central and local governments.

Also in 1983, Keikyu secured authority (a "license," as the Japanese say) to build an underground extension to the airport terminals. It started construction in 1988, opened a new underground station near the airport in 1993, and completed the project at the end of 1998. Cost: about $665 million in today's dollars, with 17.5 percent paid by the central government. The company borrowed the remainder from the Japan Development Bank. Keikyu pays an annual rent equal to 2.3 percent of appraised value for the tunnels within the airport perimeter. The extension was anticipated to increase traffic on the branch (long known as the "Airport Line" even though trains did not enter the airport) from 28,000 to 35,000 passengers daily.

The Monorail carried 60,000 to 80,000 airport passengers per day prior to opening of the Keikyu extension. Airport traffic made up 60 to 70 percent of all Monorail passengers. Total traffic fell by 15 percent following completion of the Keikyu airport extension.

The Tokyo Monorail has had four generations of rolling stock. It opened with 47 cars and two diesel shop switchers. The early rolling stock was arranged in three-car sets; each car was 35' 5" long. A photo of a test run one month prior to opening shows a nine-car train. Cars purchased after 1969 were 49' 10" long. Air conditioning was introduced in 1982. Today, the Monorail has 114 aluminum-bodied cars, permanently coupled in 19 six-car trains. All were built by Hitachi. The newest vehicles are 9' 11" wide overall, 14' 10' high overall, 9' 4" over the support beam top surface, and 7' 5" over the passenger compartment floor.

Cross-sectional dimensions of the support beam: 4' 7" high x 2' 7" wide. Traction current is 750V dc.

Performance specifications: acceleration 1.9 mph/sec, service braking 2.2 mph/sec, emergency braking 2.8 mph/s. The maximum permitted speed is 50 mph.

Scheduled running time over the line is 22 minutes for 10.5 miles, giving a "schedule speed" of 28 mph.

The minimum interval between trains is 3 min 20 sec; which is operated during the a.m. peak. However, this is not sustained over a 60-minute interval. The maximum number of trains per hour is 19, which is typical of Japanese practice. Japanese "rail" systems avoid operating headways shorter than 3 min when possible.

The minimum headway is set by the inner terminal, which is single-"track." The "old" Haneda terminal had two tracks, but the 0.5-mile tunnel leading to it was single-track. A planned new double-track terminal at Hamamatsu-cho would permit a minimum headway of 2 min.

Service operates every 4-5 minutes throughout the day, between 5 a.m. and 11:30 p.m. On weekdays, there are 254 "down" (toward Haneda) and 255 "up" (toward Hamamatsu-cho) trains. On Sundays and holidays, there are 234 "down" and 235 "up" trains.

As traffic grew, midday service was progressively increased: from 10 to 8 min in 1970, to 7 minutes in 1971, to 6 min in 1973, and to 5 min in 1985. The new, longer "bogie" stock acquired from 1969 was operated in four-car trains until completion of platform lengthening in 1974. All trains were lengthened to six cars with the July 1983 timetable change. The most recent improvement, being completed early in 2002, was addition of automatic platform barriers (as used at the Westlake Center monorail terminal in Seattle). These would permit driver-only operation of trains.

The maximum hourly traffic volume is reported at 10,512 passengers per hour (per direction). As staed above, the maximum service level is 19 trains/hr per direction, and each six-car train is 93.6 meters long. This works out to 92 pass/veh and 5.9 passengers per meter of vehicle length, averaged over the busiest hour. These statistics are not remarkable for Japan -- but are 20-50 percent higher than the 4 to 5 pass/m "maximum" for most U.S. and Canadian cities.

In other words, to carry 10,512 American or Canadian consumers per hour, the Monorail would have to provide 20 to 50 percent more peak-period service than it does -- and can -- today.

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/29/2002 04:06:00 PM

 
He's Not Mediocre-He's Just Average II

From the Cabalmaster:

If you were preparing population statistics for, say, the San Francisco Bay Area, would you count San Francisco as “urban” and everything else as “suburban”?

EVERYTHING else? Including Oakland, Alameda, Berkeley and Richmond?

If so, then a promising career at the Wendell Cox Consultancy may await you -- and you can explain to us some of the things we’ve found on “Demographia.”

We opinionated Transitcabalists admit that deciding which parts of the Bay Area (or other “ploycentric” metropolitan regions) should be classified as “urban” and “suburban” is not straightforward. Counting Oakland as “suburban,” for example, seems senseless, but we acknowledge that one might make a strong case for including San Jose among the “suburbs.”

But we also think that “Demographia” is remarkably weak (and more than a bit lame) in this respect when it comes to the three largest Japanese metro areas.

The “Demographia” page that shows “suburbanization” in the Tokyo region (www.demographia.com/db-jp-toksub.htm) doesn’t even bother to define the Tokyo metropolitan region. However, the urbanized area contains the following “major” centers:

Tokyo (23 wards): 7.9 million
Yokohama: 3.4 million
Kawasaki: 1.2 million
Chiba: 0.9 million

The officially-defined urbanized area (within a 31-mile–50 km–radius of Tokyo station) houses about 30 million people. The “urban” share is 26 percent if based on Tokyo alone -- or 45 percent if based on Tokyo, Yokohama, Kawasaki and Chiba. Since this page presents only percentage comparisons, it’s difficult to discern the doings of the “Demographia” denizens.

It would be possible to argue against the inclusion of Kawasaki as “urban,” on grounds that much of the land area consists of suburbs which were developed relatively recently. However, we can‚t imagine why anyone would dream that Yokohama is a “suburb.”

It is also possible to argue that several smaller cities should be counted as “urban” because they are old enough and have a sufficiently “urban” character.

This “Demographia” page that shows suburbanization in the Osaka region does define the metropolitan region -- “Osaka, Hyogo and Kyoto” prefectures (www.demographia.com/db-jp-osasub.htm). Hyogo prefecture includes Kobe, and Kyoto prefecture includes . . . well, Kyoto:

Osaka: 2.5 million
Kobe: 1.5 million
Kyoto: 1.4 million

Obviously, the logical “urban” share of population (within the “official” 31-mile–50 km–radius of Osaka station) would more than double in size if Kyoto and Kobe were included. Again, we do not understand the “logic” of classifying Kobe and Kyoto as Osaka “suburbs” -- and again, we don’t know whether “Demographia” does or not. At least two smaller cities would be difficult to classify as “suburbs” for historic reasons: Himeji (west of Kyoto) and Uji (just southeast of Kyoto).

The “official” definition of the urbanized area: a 31-mile (50 km) radius from Osaka station. “Demographia” uses a different definition without explanation (as usual).

“Demographia” also has a Nagoya suburbanization page (www.demographia.com/db-jp-nagsub.htm). Here, the “official” definition is a 25-mile radius from Nagoya station . . . and Demographia’s definition is “Aichi Prefecture.” Hmmm. Three cities that for historic reasons would be difficult to classify as “suburbs” are Okazaki, Seto and Toyohashi.

The “radii” that we’ve mentioned above are determined by the government based on the size of the “commmuter shed.” These “radii” have been expanded as the “commuter shed” has expanded.

(Perhaps the denizens of “Demographia” have a natural tendency to shy away from a metropolitan-region “definition” that is based on a railway station . . .)


posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/28/2002 01:58:00 PM

 
Sometimes, Wendell Cox Does Publish Useful Data...

From the Cabalmaster:

We in the Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal don't want it said that we won't be "fair" to Wendell Cox when he actually publishes a USEFUL chart.

This page, www.demographia.com/db-dense-nhd.htm is actually useful. Unlike much of Cox's work (the stuff we will continue to critique), it actually presents source data in a logical, easy-to-follow format, along with notes that help clarify data. The only typo we found was transposing the dates for the New York entry in the table.

In this case, Cox is to be commended for just presenting the data, not pontificating about it. When he starts pontificating, that's where he starts getting into trouble.


posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/27/2002 08:07:00 PM

 
TOKYO -- Tokyo Monorail (aka "Tokyo-Haneda") -- PART ONE (Monorail 14)

From the Cabalmaster:

TOKYO -- Tokyo Monorail (aka "Tokyo-Haneda") -- PART ONE

(See: www.tokyo-monorail.co.jp. Websurfers are advised that some Japanese sites require Japanese-compatible browsers and software, otherwise the "text" gets displayed as gibberish. Graphics and photos usually get displayed, even when this happens. Some but not all sites have "English" versions, but these--when available--seldom have more than a fraction of the information available in Japanese. The Tokyo Monorail site has English cues on the menu buttons, so at least you'll know "where you're going.")

The Tokyo Monorail, an icon among monorail supporters, was Japan's first attempt at applying monorail technology to a major public transport facility. It has operated successfully for nearly 40 years, for much of that time, as a profit making enterprise.

[All of this has generated a great deal of enthusiasm for similar lines in the U.S. We opinionated TransitCabalists believe that this enthusiasm is, at best, misguided.]

The Tokoy Monorail serves a unique "niche" in a unique transport market, whose characteristics permit profitable operation. Under Japanese law, the Monorail is not considered an "urban" transit route, but an "airport-access railway." If built today, it would probably use conventional rail technology.

A few quick facts about "that" market. The Tokyo metropolitan region houses roughly 30 million people within a 30-mile radius of Tokyo station (claimed as the largest agglomeration of people, and economic activity, in human history). An estimated 2.5 million people commute to jobs in Tokyo's three central wards each weekday. Along major transport corridors, traffic volumes are high enough to justify parallel tracks, and lines, to an extent unimaginable anywhere else, with the possible future exception of large cities in mainland China as they develop.

The busiest corridor is the one extending south from Tokyo station. Nine pairs of "tracks" enter
central Tokyo from the south, all within an area about 1/2 mile wide. These include two subway lines and a third underground line built for the "railway" network. On the surface, the Tokaido Main Line has three pairs of tracks, and one pair for Tokaido Shinkansen trains (which now carry substantial short-distance travel). Elevated structures carry the newest addition, the "Yurikamome" ICTS line, and the Tokyo Monorail.

We opinionated TransitCabalists can't imagine why anyone would dream about duplicating the Monorail's financial results in the U.S. or Canada. Tokyo Monorail passengers pay far more, and tolerate far higher crowding levels, than U.S. consumers would. The technology has proven itself, but does not provide greater operating efficiency than postwar U.S. rail systems. BART, for example, would return a $40 million annual operating surplus if it could match the Monorail's per-passenger fare revenue. If it could then cram additional passengers on board to match the Monorail's peak-period loads, its annual operating surplus would approach $100 million.

The area where Haneda Airport is today was once served by an electric railway branch. This was cut back after WWII, but was eventually re-extended to serve the airport. Monorail buffs may be surprised to learn that the conventional railway was "there first. "

An airfield established in 1931 became a military air base several years later, and was taken over by the U.S. military at the end of WWII. It was returned to Japanese control in 1952. Here, the Transport Ministry began building Tokyo International Airport in 1954.

The rail spur, owned by today's Keihin Electric Express Railway ("Keikyu;" pronounced roughly "kay-cue"), terminated within sight of the airport terminal, but the Keikyu management had no interest in serving Haneda Airport. The company believed -- correctly, as things turned out -- that airport traffic would not be sufficient to justify a rail link. Air traffic accounted for a tiny fraction of all intercity transport during the '50s and early '60s, and air passengers would not bring much additional revenue. Instead, Keikyu and Japan Air Lines started an express bus service to Tokyo station when the airport opened in 1955.

Planning for the 1964 Summer Olympic Games in Tokyo started in 1959. Keikyu considered an underground extension to the airport terminal but did not pursue this idea. Back then, Keikyu trains terminated at Shinagawa, south of central Tokyo. The long-planned subway to Shinagawa, used by Keikyu trains today, was in the works but not complete.

Into this breach stepped the Japan Elevated Electric Railway Co, Ltd, organized in 1960. Its president was a friend of Dr. Axel L. Wenner-Gren, the Swedish inventor who developed the Alweg monorail system. The company, renamed Tokyo Monorail Co, Ltd, received its concession in 1961 and began construction in 1963. It was financed exclusively by private investors, with no participation by the government, the airport authority or the aviation industry. But supplier Hitachi, which held the license rights for Alweg technology, did participate -- perhaps to a greater extent than originally intended. The line as built extended 8.2 miles. The line cost about $60 million at the time (about $350 million in today's dollars), with 95 percent of this amount for infrastructure and five percent for rolling stock. Opening Day was September 17, 1964.

The Tokyo Monorail's "inner" terminal, at Hamamatsu-cho railway station, is two miles south of the long-established Ginza-Yurakucho business hub. This location was selected for economy reasons, but it is easy accessible from most offices and hotels by JR Yamanote Line trains or taxi. The Monorail was built along the railway, canals, and tidal areas reclaimed from Tokyo Bay. The line has a short tunnel under a ship channel, and the original terminal had a single-beam tunnel beneath runways to a station below the main ticket counters. The maximum permitted speed is 50 mph.

The Monorail had no intermediate stations when built -- and demonstrated that Keikyu management was correct. Airport traffic alone could not support the line. A toll expressway to Haneda, also completed for the Olympics, provided strong competition. One intermediate station was added in 1965 to serve the Oi Racetrack, but the line was still not able to earn a profit. The company was merged into the Hitachi group in 1967 as "Hitachi Transportation Systems, Tokyo Monorail," eliminating all outside investment.


posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/27/2002 02:02:00 PM

 
Freeways and Health

From the Cabalmaster:

Here is an excellent link regarding the impact of freeways on the health of urban residents.

www.katycorridor.org/health.pdf

Those using modems should note that this link is large (4 megabytes.)


posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/27/2002 01:13:00 PM

 
Carl Sagan's Baloney Detection Kit

From the Cabalmaster:

Carl Sagan's Baloney Detection Kit

From www.carlsagan.com

Baloney Detection Kit

----------------------------------------------
Warning signs that suggest deception. Based on the book by Carl Sagan The Demon Haunted World. The following are suggested as tools for testing arguments and detecting fallacious or fraudulent arguments:

Wherever possible there must be independent confirmation of the facts.

Encourage substantive debate on the evidence by knowledgeable proponents of all points of view.

Arguments from authority carry little weight (in science there are no "authorities").

Try not to get overly attached to a hypothesis just because it's yours (or it's "conservative." )

Spin more than one hypothesis - don't simply run with the first idea that caught your fancy.

Quantify, wherever possible.

If there is a chain of argument every link in the chain must work.

Occam's razor - if there are two hypothesis that explain the data equally well choose the simpler.

Ask whether the hypothesis can, at least in principle, be falsified (shown to be false by some unambiguous test). In other words, it is testable? Can others duplicate the experiment and get the same result?

Additional issues are:

Conduct control experiments - especially "double blind" experiments where the person taking measurements is not aware of the test and control subjects.

Check for confounding factors - separate the variables.

Common fallacies of logic and rhetoric

Ad hominem - attacking the arguer and not the argument.

Argument from "authority".

Argument from adverse consequences (putting pressure on the decision maker by pointing out dire consequences of an "unfavorable" decision).

Appeal to ignorance (absence of evidence is not evidence of absence).

Special pleading (typically referring to god's will).

Begging the question (assuming an answer in the way the question is phrased). A Wendell Cox favorite.

Observational selection (counting the hits and forgetting the misses).

Statistics of small numbers (such as drawing conclusions from inadequate sample sizes).A common error by Cox.

Misunderstanding the nature of statistics (President Eisenhower expressing astonishment and alarm on discovering that fully half of all Americans have below average intelligence!)

Inconsistency (e.g. military expenditures based on worst case scenarios but scientific projections on environmental dangers thriftily ignored because they are not "proved").

Non sequitur - "it does not follow" - the logic falls down.

Post hoc, ergo propter hoc - "it happened after so it was caused by" - confusion of cause and effect.

Meaningless question ("what happens when an irresistible force meets an immovable object?).

Excluded middle - considering only the two extremes in a range of possibilities (making the "other side" look worse than it really is).

Short-term v. long-term - a subset of excluded middle ("why pursue fundamental science when we have so huge a budget deficit?").

Slippery slope - a subset of excluded middle - unwarranted extrapolation of the effects (give an inch and they will take a mile).

Confusion of correlation and causation.

Caricaturing (or stereotyping) a position to make it easier to attack.

Suppressed evidence or half-truths.

Weasel words - for example, use of euphemisms for war such as "police action" to get around limitations on Presidential powers. "An important art of politicians is to find new names for institutions which under old names have become odious to the public"

(excerpted from The Planetary Society Australian Volunteer Coordinators Prepared by Michael Paine ) #
posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/26/2002 11:16:00 AM

 
MONORAIL FACTS AND FIGURES - 13

From the Cabalmaster:

In this episode, we summarize (and critique) two articles:

"Monorail Development and Application in Japan," bu Shinya Kikuchi and Akira Onaka. Journal of Advanced Transportation, Vol. 22, No. 1, spring 1988, and:

"Development of Advanced Technology Transit Modes in Japan," by Shinya Kikuchi and Katsutoshi Ohta. Journal of Advanced Transportation, Vol. 23, No. 2&3, fall/winter 1989.

The fact that monorail as a mode has inherent disadvantages may come as news to some. (See: www.monorails.org See also: www.elevated.org. See also: www.riseaboveitall.org. See also: www.freewaymonorail.org.

As outlined by Kikuchi and Ohta, the major disadvantage of monorail compared to light rail (LRT) is its inability to operate in a network. "Thus, system expansion and future integration with other monorail lines to form a network with vehicles traveling from one line to another cannot be expected."

Another disadvantage: If a monorail is built underground or in a tunnel, the required vertical clearance is at least 18.4 feet, compared to 10.5 feet for LRT (Kikuchi and Onaka).

Kikuchi and Ohta cite several "constraints unique to Japan" which tend to favor new modes over conventional rail: limited availability and high price of urban land, the funding mechanism for construction of transit systems, political considerations and a tendency to seek novelty in transit technology, and the (previous) administration of transport planning [prior to consolidation of the Construction and Transport ministries].

---The high price of urban land in Japan and its extreme scarcity, according to Kikuchi and Ohta, make it "almost prohibitive" to build a new rail line at at ground level.

[We are advised that Japanese law makes no provision for eminent domain or "condemnation." In addition, it is very difficult to convert agricultural land for residential use. A few "new-town" developments in the largest metropolitan areas have land reserved for future rail lines, but this is not the typical practice elsewhere.]

---Road construction funds have been available since 1972 for transit guideway construction, provided that the guideway is constructed above the road. Kikuchi and Ohta write, "This is based on the concept that the transit system is part of the road and helps allieviate the traffic congestion on the roadway, and thus, encourages the utilization of transit to complement the people carrying capacity of the corridor." This has encouraged construction of monorail and AGT lines along roadways, particularly when these roads are widened and improved. However, no large-scale funding for surface bus and streetcar systems existed at the central government level. This tended to encourage introduction of new technology rather than upgrading of existing systems.

-- Regarding political considerations, Kikuchi and Ohta write, "Novelty and symbolism play an important part of the decision process. This tendency is particularly manifested in Japan."

[However, Kikuchi and Ohta provide no examples. It is one thing to claim, for example, that "novelty and symbolism" influenced the choice for monorail in Kitakyushu, Chiba and Naha. It is quite another thing to describe what could have, or should have, been built instead of monorail. Kikuchi and Ohta do not do this.]

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/24/2002 02:44:00 PM

 
WENDELL COX IS NOT MEDIOCRE -- HE'S JUST AVERAGE - I

From the Cabalmaster:

One of these days, the Secret Worldwide TransitCabal might throw a "Wendellfest" at “Line’s End,” the pastoral (and, naturally, secret) TransitCabalist’s lair. We’ll see who can find the best example of mediocre analysis on Wendell Cox’s website.

Wendell boasts that “The Public Purpose” is “One of the National Journal’s Four Top Transport Internet Sites.” We opinionated TransitCabalists are not impressed -- and we become steadily less impressed with each essentially random visit.

“The Public Purpose” and “Demographia” are full of information and analysis. However, we think that the information is often poorly organized and presented. We also think that the analyses are usually superficial, one-sided, misleading, and sometimes, just plain meaningless. (Of course, we’re opinionated, but that’s what you expect from this blog, isn’t it?)

A “Demographia” table (www.demographia.com/db-parisarron.htm) shows the 1999 population of the “Ville de Paris” at 2,125,246, and the area at 86.92 sq km (= 33.54 sq mi). The land area shown on this table -- excludes two large parks (Bois de Boulogne and Bois de Vincennes) which are located beyond the “outer” ring of “arrondisssements,” or districts (see: www.paris-france.org/ASP/CARTO2.ASP).

Note that 1 sq km = 0.3844 sq mi, and 1 sq mi = 2.6015 sq km. So the “Mile Square Regional Park” in Orange County, CA (yes, there is such a place; it’s in Fountain Valley) might be renamed “2.6 Kilometer Square Regional Park” if this country ever adopts the metric system. If 10 SAEPT laureates gather there to shout . . . well, you know . . . the “population density” would be 10 SAP(tm)s per sq mi, but only 3.8 SAP(tm)s per sq km.

“Populstat,” which, we think, has much better information than “Demographia” -- and takes much greater care regarding attribution -- states the 1999 population for Paris at 2,125,100, and gives the source as “Etat de France 2000.” See: www.library.uu.nl/wesp/populstat/Europe/francet.htm. The Economist magazine gives the land area of Paris as 105 sq km [= 40 sq mi); this includes the two large parks (see: www.economist.com/cities/findStory.cfm?city_id=PAR&folder=Facts-Figures).

Did we mention that, elsewhere on “Demographia,” the land area of Paris is stated at 105.0 sq km [= 40.5 sq mi]? See: www.demographia.com/dm-par90.htm. (Those parks . . . according to Demographia, sometimes they’re “in” Paris; sometimes they’re not . . .)

The official French government website (see: www.france.diplomatie.fr/france/gb/geo/popu01.htm) states the population density of Paris at “20,000 inhabitants per km2” (= 52,000 per sq mi). Statistik Berlin (see: www.stastik-berlin.de/aktuell/europa2002/fb-europawoche-e.pdf) states the population density at 20,171 “persons per sq km” (= 52,474 pper sq mi). These figures include the two large parks.

Elsewhere on “Demographia” (www.demographia.com/db-paris9099.htm) we found a page titled “Paris Population History: Analysis and Data, which contains the following passage:

“Paris Remains the Most Dense Major City in the Developed World: Nonetheless, Paris remains by far the developed world’s most densely populated major city, at 63,374 per square mile (24,450 per square mile [sic - he means “per square km”). Paris is [sic] approximately double the density of Tokyo, three times as dense as inner London and six times as dense as Greater London. Paris is at least 2.5 times as dense as New York [sic - we assume he means New York City].”

This, we think, is a prime example of weak -- and lame -- analysis.

Metropolitan “core” cities very greatly in land area, and in the “percent” of the total urbanized area that is contained within their boundaries. The City of Calgary (Canada), for example, includes virtually all of the urbanized area. The City of London, by contrast, includes just one square mile. Meaningful comparisons regarding “density” should be based on areas of comparable size.

If Wendell’s assertion is meaningfully true -- that is, related to something that can be observed in real life -- then we should NOT be able to find ANY Paris-sized chunk of the “Big Apple” with MORE than about 25,000 per square mile. (63,174 divided by 2.5 = 25,270; we’ve rounded to the nearest thousand. In metric terms, we should not be able to find any Paris-sized chunk of NYC with more than 24,450 / 2.5 = 9,780 sq km.)

As you’ll see, the MAJORITY of New York City’s population is housed in areas that have considerably MORE than 25,000 people per square mile. A convenient “Demographia” chart (www.demographia.com/dm-nyc.htm) provides the following information:

Borough Pop (2000 census) Land Area (sq mi) Density

Manhattan 1,537,000 22 69,873
Bronx 1,333,000 42 35,219
Brooklyn 2,495,000 70 31,730
SUBTOTAL 5,365,000 134 40,037

Queens 2,229,000 109 20,453
Staten Island 443,000 59 7,513

TOTAL 8,008,000 302 26,517

(If you don‚t trust “Demographia,” see: factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?ds_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U&geo_id=04000US36&_box_head_nbr=GCT-PH1&format=ST-7. You will find minor differences; we think these arise, on the part of “Demographia,” from 1.) rounding and 2.) sloppyness.)

Several facts become immediately obvious:

---The City of New York covers nine times more land than the Ville de Paris, and the three most densely-populated boroughs cover four times as much land.

---Brooklyn, The Bronx and Manhattan house 67 percent of New York City's population but account for just 44 per cent of its land area.

---Thinly-populated Staten Island accounts for nearly 20 percent of the city’s land area.

---Queens, which is relatively thinly-populated overall, accounts for 36 percent of New York City’s land area.

---The population density for Manhattan, The Bronx and Brooklyn combined is 40,000 per sq mi, 63 percent of the figure “Demographia” presents for Paris -- which covers just 1/4 as much land.

---Manhattan, with 66 percent of the “adjusted” Paris land area, has a significantly greater population density (WITHOUT adjustments such as subtracting Central Park . . .)

---There are some Manhattan neighborhoods with gross population densities exceeding 100,000 per square mile, and a number that exceed 200,000 per square mile. These are primarily on the Upper West and Upper East Sides, which are the highest income areas with the highest prices for flats in New York City.

---The combined population density for Manhattan and The Bronx is nearly 45,000 per square mile, 71 percent of the Paris figure (Paris covers little more than 1/2 as much land).

Portions of Brooklyn, Queens or The Bronx contiguous to Manhattan might form a “sub-region” with land area equal to Paris but with greater population -- that is, with greater population density.

We’ll conclude with the following opinion:

If “Paris is at least 2.5 times as dense as New York” typifies the analytical sophistication of “The Public Purpose” and “Demographia,” then people who quote these sites as “authoritative” jeopardize their own credibility by doing so.



posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/24/2002 02:17:00 PM

 
Another Wendell Coxism: Missing Context

From the Cabalmaster:

As we've said, Wendell Cox often has "correct" data. But then he often misses the "big picture."

For example, this entry www.publicpurpose.com/ut-porwest.htm would trick many people, particularly the uncritical, into thinking that the Portland's West Side light rail line, which opened in September 1998, has "failed." This appears to be Cox's motive.

Well, to understand the complete context, two key pieces of information are missing: the rate of job growth in Portland's western suburbs was very high during the same period the LRT line, opened, a reflection of the well-known "high tech" orientation of the area during the late 1990's "dot.com boom." Population in Washington County also increased faster than the Portland area average, generating more total trips by all modes, both in major corridors and locally.

The other key fact is that the new LRT line significantly increased the total transit market share in the Sunset Highway corridor. Details are at Portland State University, Institute of Portland Metropolitan Studies and at the Tri-Met web site.

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/22/2002 01:54:00 AM

 
A Wendell Cox "MacGuffin" a la Hitchcock?

From the Cabalmaster:

Alfred Hitchcock was famous for "MacGuffins" in his movies. "MacGuffins" are, as defined by this Hitchcock site:

www.labyrinth.net.au/~muffin/subscribing_c.html

"The journal is named after Hitchcock's/ Angus MacPhail's name for a diversionary plot device. (So perhaps our 'MacGuffin' is just a pleasant diversion from the films themselves!) Every Hitchcock buff knows the concept of the MacGuffin. In our first issue, we compared it to T.S. Eliot's definition of 'meaning' in poetry: how it's like the bone thrown by the burglar to distract the watchdog of the mind - while the poem, the burglar, goes about its real business".

From what we in the Transitcabal have seen, this definition of "MacGuffins" also accurately describes much of what Wendell Cox does.

Now whether the following Cox item qualifies as a “MacGuffin” remains to be seen. How this might also be used in future analysis (sic) remains to be seen:

www.demographia.com/db-jhbal1990walk.htm

"WORK TRIP WALKABILITY IN US METROPOLITAN AREAS
Neighborhood Jobs-Housing Balance Index, 1990 (Draft)"

As Cox describes this:

“The Neighborhood Jobs-Housing Balance Index is average variance of jobs and housing (lesser divided by greater) by transportation analysis zone (TAZ) (or other measure used in the metropolitan area) as reported in USDOT Census Transportation Package 1990. This theoretical home-work walkability indicator does not take into consideration how well local residents might match to local jobs.

Perfect balance = 1.000.

Range = 0.000 to 1.000.

Higher score indicates greater balance (greater walkability).
Additional details below."

The measure Cox is reporting is interesting, I suppose, but it is only a very crude indicator of "walkability." At an aggregate level, such a measure doesn't reveal much without more context. How “theoretical walkability” compares to real “walkability” is discussed below.

BTW, "Neighborhood Jobs-Housing Balance" is a different concept than "walkability," in the sense that most analysts have used the latter term. If a TAZ has a balance of jobs on one side but is separated from residential by dead-end streets or a freeway, "walkability" is obviously near nil. There is no way to measure the actual, on-the-ground "walkability" without actually going out and looking, or spending a lot of time with maps, aerial photos, and a GIS, if one is lucky enough to have access to a GIS system.

Regardless of what one may think of the LUTRAQ work that was done in Portland, one of the useful things was the "Pedestrian Environmental Factor" ("PEF") that came out of that study, was the following report:

ntl.bts.gov/DOCS/tped.html

"4. Overview"

"This volume is a supplement to Volume 4 of the LUTRAQ Project, issued in November, 1992. In that report the authors describe several travel model enhancements made to the forecasting system used by Metro in Portland, Oregon. Of greatest relevance here is a description of a new variable, called the "Pedestrian Environmental Factor" (PEF). This measure is a composite of four different attributes of the natural and built environment, which were shown to improve the accuracy of several sub-models in the Portland system. In particular, the pre-mode choice model (walk/bike vs .motorized modes) was enhanced by the introduction of the PEF measure into the set of equations on which the model was calibrated. As developed by the Metro staff in consultation with the LUTRAQ Consultant Team the PEF consists of an assessment of each of 400 zones in the regional travel demand forecasting model network for each of the four following parameters:

- Ease of street crossings
- Sidewalk continuity
- Local street characteristics (grid vs. cul de sac)
- Topography

"To estimate ease of street crossings at the zonal level, staff identified key intersections and evaluated their width, extent of signalization and traffic volumes. For a measure of sidewalk continuity, staff judged the extensiveness of sidewalks on principal arterials served or likely to be served in the future by transit. Secondary attention was paid to the extent of sidewalks on neighborhood collector streets. As a measure of connectivity of street systems, staff estimated the extent of grid street patterns in each zone. They also examined the fineness of the grid (distance between intersections). As a measure of topography staff evaluated the extensiveness of sloping terrain and the steepness of these slopes. Each zone in the model system was scored on a three-point scale for each of the four characteristics named above. A composite score (four-12) was created for each zone, with 12 being the highest possible and four the lowest. Four different staff completed this exercise independently and then compared results in order to enhance the objectivity of the analysis. Some zonal scores were modified on specific parameters to reflect a consensus reached on their characteristics. This simplified Delphi approach resulted in consensus on rankings for the entire network of zones. Table 1 summarizes the distribution of pedestrian environmental factor scores. Figure 2 shows the location of the 400 traffic analysis zones used in the analysis and Figure 3 summarizes the distribution of the PEF scores associated with each of them."

Since it is a direct measurement "on the ground," PEF seems a far more useful measure of "walkability" than how Cox is trying to equate jobs-housing balance with “walkability.” Fortunately PEF is something that can also be measured relatively easily using aerials and GIS, if one wants to take the time and has access to the data. I'll leave this to planners who have daily access to such nice databases. This is a good exercise that all General Plan updates should incorporate.




posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/22/2002 01:04:00 AM

 
TRANSIT MODE CHOICE IN JAPAN, Part 2 (Monorail 12)

From the Cabalmaster:

This installment continues with the Japanese criteria for building monorails and other fixed-guideway transport facilities.

"Transport gap" is the term used to describe traffic-density levels too high for efficient bus operation, but too low to justify conventional rail. These traffic levels are considered the domain of medium-duty systems such as monorail, AGT and LRT. (G. Bouladon, "The Transport Gaps," Science Journal, April 1967. G. Bouladon, "Transport," Science Journal, October 1967).

"Monorail" is defined as traveling along a single guideway, on rubber tires, either straddling the guideway or suspended from it.

Its advantages over conventional rail include: less land requirement, and ability to negotiate steeper grades and sharper curves, making construction within the alignment of existing roads more practical.

Recent monorail specifications include:

--Construction cost: $50-100 million per mile for infrastructure; $40-90 million per mile for equipment and rolling stock.

--Schedule speed: 19 mph.

--Maximum capacity: 26,000 pass/hr per direction. This is based on 6-car trains, 2-minute headways, and 95 passengers per vehicle, about 6.1 passengers per meter of vehicle length.

[A similar service level, with identical vehicles, in most U.S. or Canadian urban corridors would carry no more than 17,000 - 20,000 passengers per hour per direction.]

--Average annual operating cost for monorail is estimated at $3 million per route-mi. Thus, a monorail line would need to attract 6,500 passengers per route-mi per day, each paying an average fare of $1.25, in order to cover operating costs.

Comparative figures for subways:

---Construction cost: $340-400 million per mile, or $270-280 million for small-profile subways.

---Schedule speed: 20 mph, or 21 mph for small-profile subways [probably owing to faster acceleration].

---Maximum capacity: 64,000 pass/hr per direction. This is based on 10-car trains, 2-minute headways, and 214 passengers per vehicle, about 10.7 passengers per meter of vehicle length.

[A similar service level, with similar vehihcles, in most U.S. or Canadian corridors would carry no more than 24,000 - 30,000 passengers per hour per direction -- assuming the existence of sufficient demand).

---Maximum capacity for a small-profile subway is 35,000 pass/hr per direction, based on 8-car trains, and 146 passengers per vehicle, about 8.9 meters per meter of vehicle length (or 16,000 - 20,000 pass/hr per direction in most U.S. or Canadian corridors).

---Average annual operating cost: $9 million per route-mile, requiring 19,700 passengers per route-mi per day, each paying an average fare of $1.25, to cover operating costs.

Comparative figures for "Automated Guideway Transit" or AGT:

---Construction cost: $50-130 million per mile for infrastructure; $40-90 million per mile for equipment and rolling stock.

---Schedule speed: 17 mph.

---Maximum capacity: 18,000 pass/hr per direction. This is based on 6-car trains, 2-minute headways, and 98 passengers per vehicle, about 11.5 passengers per meter of vehicle length (or 6,000 - 8,000 pass/hr per direction in most U.S. or Canadian corridors).

---Average annual operating cost: $3 million per route-mile, requiring 7,000 passengers per route-mi per day, each paying an average fare of $1.25, to cover operating costs.

Comparative figures for "LRT:"

---Construction cost: $44 million per mile.

---Schedule speed: 12-16 mph.

---Maximum capacity: 14,000 pass/hr per direction. This is based on two-car trains (or single articulated cars), 2-minute headways, and 225 passengers per vehicle, about 8.9 passengers per meter of vehicle length (or 6,000 - 8,000 pass/hr per direction in most U.S. or Canadian corridors).

---Average annual operating cost: $1.5 million per route-mile, requiring 3,400 passengers per route-mi per day, each paying an average fare of $1.25, to cover operating costs.

In Japan, "LRT" refers essentially to high-performance streetcar lines, operating on tracks built in roads but separated from other traffic.


posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/21/2002 10:40:00 PM

 
TRANSIT MODAL CHOICE IN JAPAN (Monorail Installment 11)

From the Cabalmaster:

This installment outlines how Japan has established a practical field of application for various
urban transport modes. The criteria are very well-defined (New Urban Transport Systems Reconsidered," by Akira Nehashi, Japan Railway & Transport Review No. 16, June 1998; see: www.jrtr.net/jrtr16/f04_nehashi.html), but defy simple description.

Japanese urban transport planning lacks the highly-politicized, adversarial atmosphere of American mode-choice "contests." Instead, the "domain of efficiency" for each mode has been worked out, based on technical and economic factors. It helps to remember that Japan must import virtually all of its oil and coal.

A technical fact often overlooked by U.S. politicians, and some planners: transportation "workload" depends on how many people travel -- and how far they travel.

It takes an extremely high passenger count to justify a short-distance fixed-guideway facility. A longer facility, which can carry longer trips, does not require such a high passenger count. This would be true from the standpoint of operating efficiency even if passenger revenue were not considered. In Japan, distance-based or "stage" fares are long-established and universally accepted.

For a given traffic level, a short-distance fixed-guideway facility has a higher operating cost per passenger-mile than than a long-distance one. It therefore requires a higher passenger volume to justify construction.

It's possible to imagine (or build) a fixed-guideway facility that cannot carry enough traffic to justify its construction. The best example, in the Japanese context at least, is "personal rapid transit."

Summarizing the Japanese criteria:

--Individual transportation, on foot or bicycle, is considered adequate for all trips shorter than 0.6 mile (1.0 kilometer), and for all trips along corridors where the one-way traffic density is less than 2,000 pass-mi per mile of route. Moving sidewalks might be provided in locations where traffic is great enough.

For example, no public transportation would be provided where the average trip length was one mile and the daily (two-way) traffic volume was less than 2,500 passengers (or, more correctly, boardings per route-mile) per day.

Buses, as emphasized in Japanese transport literature, provide no economies of scale. Given a one-mile average trip length, buses are economical for traffic volumes up to 5,000 daily boardings per route-mile.

At higher volumes, bus operation becomes uneconomical (no economies of scale!), but the minimum threshold for conventional urban railways is 12,500 boardings per route-mile per day, given a one-mile average trip length.

These "thresholds" change drastically as average trip length changes -- again, owing to economies of scale!

[One critical fact that is almost never considered in the U.S.: if average trip length increases, more vehicle-miles must be operated, even if "ridership" (boardings per route-mile) does not change. If not, average vehicle occupancy will increase (more passenger-miles per route-mile), and by implication peak-hour crowding will also increase.]

Given a 5-mile average trip length, public transport becomes viable with fewer than 500 boardings per route-mile per day. Buses become uneconomic with more than 750 boardings per route-mile per day, but conventional railways are not justified with fewer than 2,000 boardings per route-mile per day. The standard Japanese transit bus is about 35 feet long, eight feet wide and seats 28 passengers. The legal "maximum load" is 74 passengers, or 6.9 passengers per meter of vehicle length. Articulated buses are not used for urban transport services in Japan.

Under the Japanese criteria, if public transportation is justified at all, and the average trip length ranges from 6 miles (with 700 daily boardings per route-mile) to 31 miles (with 130 daily boardings per route-mile), it is better to build a railway than operate buses.

Skeptics are reminded that 1) these criteria were developed with reference to Japanese economic conditions, and 2) buses provide no economy of scale. Longer trips require more vehicle-miles per passenger, and so the "economy of scale" effect reduces the boarding "threshold" as average trip length increases.

Express ("highway") buses are efficient only for longer trips, and once the daily boarding count exceeds 200 per route-mile, high-speed rail becomes more efficient.

It is essential to keep these numbers in context. A suburban rail line handling an average travel distance of 31 miles would be longer than 31 miles end-to-end. The minimum daily "boarding count" required to justify a 50-mile suburban rail line becomes 6,500. Converting from "average daily" to "average weekday" ridership in line with U.S. practice, this implies more than 8,000 boardings per weekday.



posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/19/2002 07:15:00 PM

 
Hahvahd: Give it to 'em one more time!

From the Cabalmaster:

Just in case anyone thought we were being unfair to other institutions of higher learning -- or unfair to the denizens of Hahvahd Yahd -- The Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal has provided the following list of references for you to check out. As you’ll see, certain Harvard economists have gone above and beyond the call of duty to spread the SAEPT slogan far and wide.

(Can you imagine anyone daring to shout, “STOP BUILDING RAIL SYSTEMS, DAMMIT!” in downtown Tehran?? Kinda hard to imagine these days!!)

Bangkok:

Kain, John F. "Comprehensive Reassessment of Bangkok's Transport and Urban Development Options." Memorandum No. 1, National Economic and Social Development Board, Government of Thailand, August 3, 1982.

Kain, John F. "Draft Terms of Reference: A Comprehensive Reassessment of Bangkok's Transport and Urban Development Options." Report prepared for the National Economic and Social Development Board, Government of Thailand, September, 1982.

Kain, John F. "Comments on 'STTR Preliminary Findings Report." Report to National Economic and Social Development Board on the Bangkok Short Term Transportation Review, May 1985.

Kain, John F. "Comments on 'STTR Principal Findings Report and Suggested Actions." Report to National Economic and Social Development Board on the Bangkok Short Term Transportation Review, August 1985.

See:
www.nycsubway.org/asia/Bangkok
www.metropla.net/as/bang/bangkok.htm
www.bts.co.th
www.mrta.or.th [NOTE: This site has a nice map, but is in Thai only.]
www.2bangkok.com/2bangkok/MassTransit/MasterMap.shtml
www.2bangkok.com/2bangkok/Skytrain/index.shtml
web.mit.edu/civenv/html/people/alumni_newsletters/summer_01/art2.htm

Jakarta:

Kain, John F., and Jose A. Gomez-Ibanez. "Review of the Jabotabek Railway Project." Report prepared for the Harvard Institute of International Development (HIID) Advisory Team in Indonesia, January 1988.

"Bus Priority and Segregated Busways for Jakarta. " Report prepared for the Harvard Institute of International Development (HIID) Advisory Team in Indonesia, February 9, 1988.

See:
indahnesia.com/language.switch.php?link=/Indonesia/Jawa/Files/Jakarta/Subway_Information.php&lang

Singapore:

Hansen, Kenneth R., Jose A. Gomez-Ibanez, John F. Kain, Don H. Pickrell, and Robert S. Emslie. "Reviewing the Proposed Singapore Mass Rapid Transit System: Preliminary Report." Republic of Singapore, July 1980.

Meyer, John R., John F. Kain, Gerald M. McCue, Don H. Pickrell, Robert S. Emslie, and Kenneth R. Hansen. "Singapore's Transport and Urban Development Options: Summary Report of the MRT Review Team." Republic of Singapore, 1980.

Fauth, Gary R., John F. Kain and Jose A. Gomez-Ibanez. "Critique of the Singapore Comprehensive Transportation Study (CTS) Phase A Final Report." Report prepared for the Republic of Singapore, November 1981.

See:
www.nycsubway.org/asia/Singapore
www.metropla.net/as/sing/singapore.htm”
www.smrtcorp.com
www.slrt.com.sg

Tehran:

Beesley, M.E., Gary R. Fauth and John F. Kain. "Transport Planning for Teheran: An Evaluation of the SOFRETU Study." Report prepared for the National Planning Organization, Teheran, Iran, April 1974.

Fauth, Gary R., and John F. Kain. "Transport Planning for Teheran: Transport and Land Use Alternatives." Report prepared for the National Planning Organization, Teheran, Iran, September 1974.

See:
www.enn.com/news/wire-stories/2001/08/08302001/ap_44805.asp
www.metropla.net/as/teehr/tehran.htm”
www.tehranmetro.com
www.tehranavenue.com/at_metro2.htm

We ever-opinionated TransitCabalists give these guys credit for tenacity, determination and consistency . . . if nothing else.

And just in case there’s any Harvard economists browsing this blog, we suggest that they take a look at:

www.mistral.co.uk/hammerwood/song.htm

Then, they might consider the following paradox: “their” song remains the same, but Led Zeppelin had infinitely greater success with “The Song Remains the Same.” Perhaps there‚s a reason why “Led Zepp” never recorded “STOP BUILDING RAIL SYSTEMS, DAMMIT!”


posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/19/2002 06:47:00 PM

 
Example of Why Wendell Cox is a Mediocre Researcher, At Best

From the Cabalmaster:

See www.demographia.com/db-frauto99.htm for a example of what is generally wrong with Wendell Cox's (or is some of it the "Secret Anti-Transit Cabal" mailing lists'?) work.

At first glance, this table showing auto ownership and availability in France appears reasonable. In this table, www.demographia.com shows us that the "automobile share" of French households is 79.1%. Certainly the base data displayed, total households and total number of vehicles, is quite correct.

But a closer looks reveals the fallacy inherent in the data. A key, central piece of data is missing. That is:

Average number of autos owned by households that own autos!

By definition, each auto-owning household in France owns at least one auto.

But if the average auto-owning household in France owns an average of 1.2 ( we think not unreasonable given the U.S. average is probably close to 2 per household), then the actual "automobile share" will be 65.9%, NOT 79.1%.

This would mean that 34.1% of households in France don't have an auto, not the 20.9% implied by the Cox analyis.

So Mr. Cox, what is the CORRECT number of autos per auto-owning household in France? We assume the data source used by Cox et al would have information this could be derived from, even if working backwards from data about non-auto owning households.

Cox has dismissed The Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal because we've questioned his motives and also his scholarship. But if even we, who are avowed opponents of his point of view, can spot such oversights with literally about 2 minutes perusal (note: at a site we only occassionally look at, and a page on that site we randomly selected!), imagine what we could find if we had more than 30-60 minutes per day to double check the Cox Cabal numbers!

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/18/2002 04:01:00 PM

 
"Cox Watch" Group Added to Yahoo

From the Cabalmaster:

We in the Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal have added a new Yahoo group "Cox Watch" to keep a (private) eye on well, you know who, Mr. Fudge.

Here is info...

Subscribe: coxwatch-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
Unsubscribe: coxwatch-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
List owner: coxwatch-owner@yahoogroups.com

Well, www.scoobiedavis.blogspot.com keeps an eye on ex-1960's radical, now turned outspoken conservative David Horowitz, we can do the same thing for a minor celebrity like Mr. Fudge.

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/17/2002 09:56:00 AM

 
Transit Critics Debunked, Once Again

From the Cabalmaster:

Here is a very recent, excellent factual debunking of typical anti-transit mythology from Mass Transit magazine.

And Clown Prince Usenet Trollers(tm) like "Bobby the C" (Cote) and "T. Mark Gibbon" Gibson accuse transit advocates, and the Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal(tm) of NOT having facts.

Tsk, tsk, tsk...



posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/16/2002 11:55:00 PM

 
Robert Cote is Not Real...or Is He Mark Gibson?

From the Cabalmaster:

Here is text of a bounced email from the fake email used by Robert Cote when posting to alt.planning urban and misc.transport.urban-transit:

Message from yahoo.com.
Unable to deliver message to the following address(es).

:
206.46.170.12 does not like recipient.
Remote host said: 550 Invalid recipient:
Giving up on 206.46.170.12.

--- Original message follows.

Return-Path:
Message-ID:
Received: from XXX by web13004.mail.yahoo.com via HTTP;
Fri, 16 Aug 2002 16:50:52 PDT
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2002 16:50:52 -0700 (PDT)
From: D Vallejo
Subject: This is a Test
To: techscan@gte.net
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii

Cote, are you there?

Repeat, are you there?

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/16/2002 04:53:00 PM

 
MONORAIL FACTS AND FIGURES - 10

From the Cabalmaster:

In this installment, we've outlined the reasons for proliferation of monorails and other transit gadgets in Japan -- and the reasons why no significant application of light rail has taken place.

Japan has a need for "intermediate-capacity" transit systems, able to carry 5,000 - 15,000 passegers per hour, with an average travel distance in the range of 2-9 miles, at (passenger) speeds in the range 12-25 mph. The need is to provide faster travel times than buses in mixed traffic (which are often very slow in Japan), a high service frequency, and high service reliability for medium-sized cities, for links to new suburban development, and for connections between suburbs where subway construction cannot be justified.

[We emphasize that Japanese capacity figures are based on Japanese loading standards, which reflect peak-period crowding levels that few if any Americans with access to auto alternatives would tolerate.]

[Once again, in case this message hasn't gotten through: JAPANESE CAPACITY FIGURES REFLECT PEAK HOUR LEVELS THAT MOST AMERICANS WILL NOT TOLERATE!]

Notice the similarity to the "field of application" for LRT in the U.S. and Canada.

However, urban land is very scarce and extremely expensive in Japan ("outrageous" was the proper term before the collapse of the "bubble economy" after 1990). New surface-level systems are prohibitively expensive -- unless land for transportation corridors has been set aside in advance of development (which does happen in Japan -- years if not decades in advance).

Except for short freight branches, there is no such thing as an abandoned rail corridor in any Japanese city. All that were ever built remain in use (or were built over ages ago following abandonment). In rural areas, some abandoned railbeds have been converted to recreational trails -- preserved in case they are ever needed again.) There are a few freight lines planned for rebuilding as passenger lines, but as full-scale electrified suburban railways.

Most Japanese cities have narrow streets -- extremely narrow. The typical Japanese residential street is no wider than the typical American alley. There are, of course, major roads that were built wide, or have been widened. Of the largest cities, only Nagoya undertook large-scale street widening during postwar reconstruction.

(Hiroshima, of course, was utterly devastated. The rebuilt city's streets do not follow the same pattern as before, and the main streets were rebuilt on somewhat different alignments, much wider than before -- one of the reasons it has Japan's finest streetcar network today.)

Finding roads wide enough to build a conventional "full-scale" railway on viaduct is difficult, if not impossible. Required overall road width, permitting space for columns and stations, is 25 meters between stations, and 35 meters at stations. This is for a full-scale "conventional" railway on viaduct, with roadways on either side.

One of the factors stimulating development of various transit "gadgets" is strong pressure to reduce the weight of trains in order to reduce the size of support structures.

Another factor: since 1972, road construction funds have been available for transit "guideways" so long as this is constructed above the road (or, in some cases, below the road). Central and local governments share the infrastructure cost, up to 44.9 percent of the total cost.

By contrast, there has been no large-scale funding for improvement of bus and streetcar systems (although very recently, central government funds paid part of the cost of a streetcar extension for the first time). This situation has encouraged development of new technology rather than gradual upgrading of existing systems.

Nagoya has made the most significant investment in upgraded bus systems. Its "Key Route" bus services include reserved lanes, traffic signal priority, and widely-spaced stops. However, Nagoya is probably the only large Japanese city (other than Hiroshima) able to implement such measures. A new, elevated "guideway bus" or guided busway line opened in 2001.

New transit systems have "novelty" and "symbolism" appeal, particularly for newly-developed suburbs. However, lines built primarily for this purpose tend not to show favorable financial results.

Bureaucratic turf battles also spurred the proliferation of monorails and gadgets. Prior to consolidation, the Construction and Transport ministries were rivals: the former responsible for roads, the latter for railways. The Construction Ministry tended to favor various rubber-tired systems and monorails, while the Transport Ministry favored conventional rail lines. The new Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport is responsible for airports, railways and roads.



posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/16/2002 04:31:00 PM

 
MORE WENDELL COX CRITIQUES

From the Cabalmaster:

MORE WENDELL COX CRITIQUES Just what you’ve been waiting for!

The Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal‚s Recommended Reading List includes the following title: “Responding to Wendell Cox: A Report by G. B. Arrington, Parsons Brinkerhoff Quade & Douglas, Inc” (see: www.cfte.org/images/response_cox.pdf.

This thorough, 16-page critique includes a section that “takes statements selected verbatim from Cox's many editorials and publications, compares them to readily available sources and provides appropriate citations. In every instance, Cox's statements are either inaccurate, distortions or claims not supported by the facts. Cox's technique seems to be to start with a snippet of the truth and stretch it like taffy until it turns into something else that supports his position.

[“ . . . stretch it like taffy . . .” See? We’ve been telling you that Wendell is a purveyor of fudge and other confections!]

This source contains refutation of various “Cox Myths:”

--"An analysis of actual US data on all new light rail systems indicates that no system carries more than 1/3 of the volume of a single freeway lane."

--"There is no connection whatsoever between new urban rail and traffic relief."

--" . . .on average fewer than 25 percent of light rail riders are former automobile drivers."

--"On average the cost to build and operate motorways, including private auto costs, are 1/7 th that of light rail per passenger kilometer."

--"Little unsubsidized, market based light rail development has occurred."

--"As little as 10 percent of the cost of building and operating light rail systems are recovered in fares."

--"In some cases (construction) costs have increased by as much as 325% compared to original projections"

--"Even Portland, Oregon, with its mythical transit orientation, is nothing more than a sprawling metropolis barely half as dense as Los Angeles."

--"Portland is not unique. It sprawls like any other U.S. urban area."

--"Portland is not winning the battle against traffic congestion. Since 1982, Portland's FHWA Roadway Congestion Index has risen 33 percent, nearly equal to Atlanta's 36 percent."

If you‚d like citations to Wendell‚s actual quotations, together with facts that demonstrate the opposite (together with verifiable references!), we again recommend that you check out Mr. Arrington's paper.

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/15/2002 03:45:00 PM

 
READ OTHER CRITIQUES OF WENDELL COX

From the Cabalmaster:

Don‚t just take our word for it!

THE NEMESIS OF URBAN RAIL. We ever-opinionated TransitCabalists are willing to bet that Wendell relishes this title, publicity hound that he is.

However, we are also willing to bet that you’ll find the short, astute critique that bears this title well worth reading (“The Nemesis of Urban Rail - Impressions of Wendell Cox”. See: www.student.carleton.edu/orgs/farmhouse/lrt/essays/cox.htm). Choice quotes from this analysis are excerpted below:

“Mr. Cox is closely tied to both the libertarian and republican agendas. His funding is seldom disclosed, but many of his critics claim he is not simply interested in the facts, as he claims, but in the pocket of industrial and political concerns affiliated with traditional suburban development and high dependence on the highway system.”

“To dispute someone's true motivations is not to refute his arguments, of course. Mr. Cox's speeches are powerful, but not unanswerable by any means. He has been frequently accused of selecting misleading and non-representative facts to support highly controversial conclusions.”

“Cox's favorite examples often suffer from the lack of a demonstrable causal relationship. For example, his frequent observation that European cities with high-density urban areas and extensive urban light rail systems suffer from heavy traffic congestion is used to suggest that light rail worsens congestion where it is built. The correlation might just as easily be used to show that light rail has seen significant success in congested urban areas and is therefore appropriate for analogous U.S. cities.”

“Wendell Cox is characterized as confident, intelligent, impassive, chiding, and persuasive. Chances are he believes his own arguments are genuine and formulated for the ‘public purpose.’ Their sheer volume, however, is not enough to make them authoritative, for Mr. Cox is a perfect example of how a sufficiently complicated body of socio-economic facts can yield any amount of information supporting any position. Unlike some of his peers, Cox's assertions have substantial research efforts behind them-but they in no way exhaust the mines of information. There is always more to say.”

We hope that we’ve convinced you to check out both our site, and the Carleton.edu site out.



posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/15/2002 03:30:00 PM

 
MONORAIL FACTS AND FIGURES - 9

From the Cabalmaster:

This installment includes details of three short monorails, opened during the formative years of Japanese monorail development.

NARA - Nara Dreamland

An 840-meter supported line, equipped by Toshiba, opened at the Nara Dreamland amusement park in 1961. This is considered an amusement-park "ride," not a public-transport facility. It still exists and continues in operation.

INUYAMA - Meitetsu Monkey Park Monorail Line

We'll start this section by noting that that "Meitetsu," pronounced something like "May-tets," is an abbreviation for the Nagoya Railroad Co, Ltd, the second-largest non-JR private-sector railway in Japan. "Meitetsu Monkey Park" is a zoo, noted for its collection of monkeys, owned by the company. The single--beam monorail extends 0.7 miles between Inuyama-yuen station and the zoo. A single intermediate station serves a Shingon Buddhist temple, Inuyama Narita-san, which attracts large numbers of visitors on special occasions such as New Year's Day.

[It sounds to us like the zoo provides a traffic base to support "infrastructure" that is very useful on peak-traffic days.]

Meitetsu began developing recreational facilities near Inuyama in 1925. One of these, opened in 1955, was "Picnic Land," a nature park later renamed "Rhein Park" (A section of the Kiso River near Inuyama was christened Nihon Rhein, "Japan Rhine," by a geologist inspired by the sight of Inuyama Castle perched on a hill overlooking the river.) Transportation to Inuyama-yuen station was provided by a bus service, creatively named "Momotaro Line" (Momotaro, "Peach Boy," is the legendary hero of a well-known Japanese folk tale). Then, in 1958, the company opened a 0.7-mile miniature railway (Otogi-teisha; "Fairy Tale Train," a direct translation would omit the word "tale") from the eastern edge of Inuyama to the park. Development continued, and the zoo was opened in 1962. The company considered a full-scale railway branch but decided on the monorail.

The Hitachi group licensed Alweg technology in 1960, and this line became the first "Hitachi-Alweg" monorail. The line has grades to 9.7 percent, and one section is built in a cut. It has two 3-car trains which can be coupled and operated as one. Schedule speed is 11 mph. Ridership averages about 2,000 per day.

KAWASAKI - Yomiuriland

Here is another "fallen flag."

Japan's next monorail was a 1.8-mile, 9-car circular Hitachi-Alweg line opened in 1964. It was built by the Kanto Race Club in an area later developed as the Yomiuriland amusement park. The nine cars operated as three-car formations. The monorail closed near the end of 1978, a victim of "motorization." Much of the guideway now supports a one-lane roadway, with lateral safety barriers, for a self-drive go-cart ride. The remainder has been demolished and removed.

NAGOYA - Higashiyama Park

Yet another "fallen flag."

Nagoya planned subway construction from the mid-1930s but was not able to start construction until 1954. The initial 1.5-mile segment opened at the end of 1957. By 1963, when the city decided to replace streetcars owing to growing traffic congestion, only 3.8 miles of subway extensions had been completed. Fulfillment of the six-route, 30-mile subway plan announced in 1950 seemed years away.

Meanwhile, the municipal Engineering Bureau became interested in monorail development. Perhaps inspired by the Ueno Park monorail, the city joined forces with the private sector in 1962 to build a demonstration line in Higashiyama Park. Nippon Airway Development Co., Ltd., organized by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and ten other firms in 1962, acquired license rights for Safege suspended-monorail technology in Japan. This enterprise was absorbed into parent Mitsubishi, apparently at an early stage. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries became the prime contractor and built the rolling stock. Construction started in 1963.

The 0.3-mile single guideway connected Higashiyama Zoo with Higashiyama Botanical Garden. The guideway cost roughly $300,000. Rolling stock and other equipment brought the total cost to about $600,000. The single car was built by Mitsubishi. Traction current was supplied at 600V dc.

The line opened early in 1964, and averaged of 1,000 passengers daily. It attracted considerable media attention, but operation was hindered by mechanical problems. These led to two four-day suspensions of operation during the first year.

It is not clear what potential applications were envisioned for monorail technology. Nagoya continued to build subways and replaced streetcars with motor buses. Surface rail operation ended in 1974. No proposals for additional monorails were advanced.

Instead of a showcase, the Higashiyama monorail became a deficit-ridden orphan. It earned a profit during its first two years, but losses began in 1966. Efforts to restore profitability failed, and the municipal transport bureau eventually lost interest. Plans for expansion of the zoo and botanical gardens apparently hastened the end, which came on the first day of 1975. The car and a short section of guideway are preserved in Higashiyama Park, but the remainder was dismantled and removed. So ended the inauspicious introduction of Safege technology to Japan.



posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/14/2002 11:17:00 AM

 
Our Favorite Rhetorical Enemy

From the Cabalmaster:

We opinionated TransitCabalists have this to say about the "Wendell Phenomenon" -- referring, of course, to our favorite foil, Wendell Cox:

Wendell Cox is a skilled media manipulator and a shameless self-promoter who once lived in Los Angeles and probably learned those "skills" there. He seems to believe in that old entertainment-industry adage: "There's no such thing as bad publicity." Another version: "Say whatever you want, just spell my name right." Gadflies, curmudgeons and dragonslayers are positive figures in American popular culture -- and Cox plays this role to the hilt.

Wendell Cox is also very good at collecting, organizing and presenting reams of data. He deserves credit for that; the guy appears to do his homework.

Cox also has a knack for putting together anti-rail arguments, presented with just the right "spin." These sound plausible until one takes a closer look. The problem: by the time people take a closer look, Wendell moves on to something else. But Cox cannot do this indefinitely before his credibility starts to erode; this process tends to proceed very rapidly once started.

Cox appears to have an insatiable appetite for publicity; he seems to bask in the glow of the limelight although he tries his best to present a low-key image. Part of his motivation may be insecurity. If this sounds unlikely, compare Wendell's work (and "curriculum vitae") with that of other rail opponents -- John F. Kain, for example. Although skilled and polished at communications, Cox is a lightweight when it comes to analysis. Little of his work would stand up to independent critical review. Slick presentation of shallow, biased analysis is the Cox trademark. Such a "show" cannot go on forever. Wendell Cox epitomizes the phrase "self-proclaimed expert." He knows this, and this fact becomes evident to anyone who gives his critique of Weyrich and Lind ("Twelve Anti-Transit Myths: A Conservative Critique;" see: www.publicpurpose.com/ut-weyrich2001.htm) more than a cursory glance.

After his fifteen minutes are up, Wendell Cox will become just another Zsa Zsa Gabor, "famous for being famous," as they say down in L.A.


posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/14/2002 11:14:00 AM

 
Proof That Morons Run Amuck in U.S. Transit Industry

From the Cabalmaster:

And other morons believe what idiots like Wendell Cox have to say...

www.sun-sentinel.com

Miami officials in hot seat over bus benches no one can sit on

Associated Press
Posted August 12 2002, 12:46 PM EDT

MIAMI -- City officials are in the hot seat -- literally.

Mayor Manny Diaz and other officials are working to fix the new black steel benches at city bus stops, which have proved too hot to sit on under the summer sun.

``I've sat on a bench myself and it's uncomfortably warm even with a pair of pants on,'' Assistant City Manager Frank Rollason said Monday.

About 150 of the 1,500 new benches have already been installed in the city, replacing older ones made of cement and wood.

Rollason said city planners discussed the potential problem in meetings, but he does not know why it was ignored when the benches were built. No more benches will be installed until the problem is resolved, he said.

Sarmiento Advertising Group was awarded the contract in January to produce the new benches. Sarmiento CEO Alberto Waisman has said his company will pay to refit benches.

The solution could be a plastic coating that would insulate the benches from the sun, Rollason and Waisman said.

Rollason said he wanted to test a bench with the coating before approving the plan.

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/13/2002 01:37:00 PM

 
Hahvahd, Take Another Hit!

From the Cabalmaster:

Referring to the article in The Stranger ("Comparison Shopping," Josh Feit, Vol 11 No. 46, Aug 1 - Aug 7 2002):

ECONorthwest is the firm (and the appropriately-surnamed Daniel Malarkey admits to being the analyst) that found that the (Seattle) Central Link LRT would have a negative ratio of benefits to costs.

But operating-cost savings would provide a positive benefit-cost ratio even if ridership did not change.

But Mr. Malarkey seems to like monorail. Perhaps because it isn't "regular" rail. He, after all, is a Harvard grad . . . ah, Hahvahd, school of Kennedys . . . Kain . . . Pickrell . . . Gomez-Ibanez . . . and the ever-"envious" Jonathan Richmond . . .)

This brings to mind one of the more memorable sentences we've read, penned by George M. Smerk (and which I hope that no one on the list will find offensive): "Benefit-cost analysis, like the words of the Holy Bible, may be used to prove almost anything."

Another memorable sentence, which we neglected to save for reference, is a quote by a New York stockbroker, published in the Wall Street Journal: "Economics is taught in this country without any reference to history, politics -- or common sense."

It would seem that Harvard-trained economists are among those most lacking in the latter quality.
posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/13/2002 12:11:00 PM

 
MONORAIL FACTS AND FIGURES - 8

From the Cabalmaster:

One fact about Japanese monorail development has become crystal clear here at the Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal: Japan decisively rejected monorail as a "general-purpose" urban transport mode -- and did so 30 years ago.

Existing Japanese monorails were built for specialized applications --primarily lines in road corridors. A few short lines were not successful and have been closed. In addition, the literature contains no hint that any "new"monorails will be authorized, other the line nearing completion in Naha (Okinawa), and sort extensions in Osaka and Chiba.

EARLY PROPOSALS:

Japan's first monorail proposal was submitted in 1913. This outlined a short line in Tokyo, between Ueno station and Asakusa, resembling the Wuppertaler Schwebebahn. Ten more proposals followed between 1923 and 1931. All were rejected by transport officials, who were skeptical of the technology, the ability of promoters to secure financing, and their various claims (inclouding ridership estimates).

TOKYO -- TOSHIMA-EN:

A 188-meter suspended monorail opened at Toshima-en amusement park, in Tokyo's northwest suburbs, in 1951. This little-known line was not much more than an amusement-park ride, and was dismantled some years ago.

TOKYO -- UENO PARK:

Large Japanese citiies began to consider streetcar replacement during the mid-1950s. The very robustness of electric railway technology helped bring about its demise. Streetcar lines in bomb-devastated cities were restored with relatively little investment. Large numbers of composite-bodied cars, with sturdy but obsolete hardware, were built to replace the thousands damaged or destroyed during the 1945 firebomb attacks.

[A well-documented account states that Hiroshima managed to restore partial service just three days after the A-bomb explosion. This account is true, and we accept it as such . . . but we still don't believe it!]

But streetcars could not continue operation indefinitely without large-scale investment for renewal and modernization. Transport and finance officials eventually decided that this investment could not be justified. Local and central government agencies cited population shifts, falling ridership, financial difficulties and rapidly rising road congestion as factors requiring investment in some other mode.

Subways were the obvious choice to replace streetcars on busy trunk lines. Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya had long-standing plans for comprehensive networks, but progress was slow owing to financial constraints. Trolleybuses and motor buses required much less capital but were totally inadequate for busy surface lines. This led to renewed interest in monorail technology.

In 1957, the Transportation Bureau, Tokyo Metropolitan Government ("Toei"), which operates surface transport and the smaller of Tokyo's subway networks, built a demonstration monorail line in Tokyo's Ueno Park. This extends330 meters, and connects two sections of Ueno Zoo. It was patterned after the Wuppertal Schwebebahn, although with rubber-tired "trucks" and a much
smaller single-beam guideway. Toei used streetcar hardware when possible. Traction current is 600V dc, and schedule speed is 12 km/h. Rolling stock is built to "half scale" -- 9.3 meters long and 1.7 meters wide. The line has a single two-car train.

This tiny line has operated successfully for more than 40 years, carrying an average of 4,000 people per day. It proved totally inadequate for busy urban trunk lines, but serves a useful purpose and has become something of a technological monument. The original cars were replaced in 1967 and again in 1984-1985. Closure was threatened at the end of the 1990s, following a Transport Ministry inquiry regarding earthquake-safety standards, adopted after the 1997 Kobe earthquake. The agencies responsible eventually decided to rebuild the line, and it was closed from January 2000 through the end of May 2001 to permit this.

It's not clear what potential applications were considered. One proposal called for construction of monorails together with the urban tollway netwrok, but this was not carried out. Replacement of major streetcar lines with monorails as an alternative to subways may have been an early idea, but this was not considered seriously for long. Toei invested considerable sums for temporary track to maintain streetcar service during service during subway construction, for permanent track after construction was finished, and for new track as part of street widening projects. This stopped in 1965, and Toei announced a five-year plan to replace all streetcars and trolleybuses in 1967. There was no mention of monorail. One streetcar line escaped closure owing to extensive private right-of-way and lack of parallel streets suitable for buses.

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/13/2002 12:06:00 PM

 
MONORAIL FACTS AND FIGURES - 7

From the Cabalmaster:

This and successive sections summarize the Japanese experience with monorail techology.

We TransitCabalists admit to being opinionated cusses, and so we'll state right here up front:

Monorail is not appropriate for "general-purpose" application in the U.S. Other modes cost less to build and operate, do not require full grade separation (e.g. intrusive elevated structures throughout), and use standard "off-the-shelf" hardware.

In addition, monorail has acquired something of a "miracle-mode" cachet in this country -- especially in Seattle. Despite the claims of monorail boosters, we are not convinced that monorail is "better, faster and cheaper" than conventional rail technology.

Now that we've said that, monorail bashers will probably not want to continue. The Japanese experience proves that the technology is workable and reliable, that there is such as thing as a working monorail "switch" (or whatever else one wishes to call it), and that monorail can be applied in a variety of urban / suburban transport markets ("New Types of Guideway Transport," by Kanji Wako and Akiira Nehashi, Japan Railway & Transport Review No. 26, February 2001; see: www.jrtr.net/jrtr26/t58_neh.html).

But monorail boosters also need not read on, for Japan is no monorail heaven. The technology has been used only for special-purpose applications, there is little prospect for any significant expansion beyond what is now under construction, and "private-sector" financing is a polite fiction.

We'll "set the stage" with a few facts about the "competition" -- private autos.

Gasoline in Japan costs roughly $3.50 - 4.70 per gallon. Most autos are very small by U.S. standards, (there are even mini-SUVs!), and so high gas prices inflict relatively less "damage" than would be the case here.

Free parking is rare to nonexistent in large cities. Metered on-street parking -- when available -- costs about $1.70 per hour. Large high-rise parking structures charge $2.50 - $5.00 per hour. Most hotels, some restaurants and most department stores provide free parking for customers. American-style parking lots, at suburban retail outlets and mini-malls, has proliferated rapidly over the past 20 years. This sort of development tends to be found around smaller cities and towns, where land is cheaper.

There are no "freeways" in Japan, where expressway tolls are very high. The flat toll for travel on the Tokyo metropolitan expressway network is about $5.80. In Nagoya, the flat toll is about $5.40). Intercity expressway tolls (and "intercity" includes Tokyo to Yokohama, for example) cost roughly $0.20 per mile.

Therefore, that weekend getaway to Kyoto, about 325 miles from Tokyo, will cost about $75 for tolls alone -- each way. This compares to about $110 one-way by shinkansen (high-speed train), or about $70 by local train (possible, but lengthy). Bridge tolls are also very high. The new "Tokyo Bay Aqualine" bridge-tunnel charges $25 per car, or $20 for a small car. However, a bus serviice crossing the same bridge (Kawasaki to Kisarazu) charges less than $12 passenger.


posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/12/2002 11:42:00 AM

 
A Musical Group with Insight into Urban Problems

From the Cabalmaster:

Here is a group of young musicians with some interesting insights into urban problems here (Burn Down the Mall, from Necropolis by "Destroy").


posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/10/2002 02:08:00 PM

 
MONORAIL FACTS AND FIGURES - 6

From the Cabalmaster:

This is the 6th of our series of lists comparing U.S. and Japanese fixed-guideway urban transit systems. This shows systems ranked by annual veh-mi per staff member, together with "service density" -- annual veh-mi per mile of route. This is a measure of relative intensity of guideway use.


Tokyo "Yurikamome" (ICTS): 42,412 ann veh-mi / staff member --- 1,009,000 ann veh-mi / rt-mi

Osaka-OTS Line (ICTS): 37,776 --- 656,154

Hiroshima "Astram Line" (ICTS): 34,891 --- 587,228

Yokohama "Kanazawa Seaside Line" (ICTS): 29,769 --- 602,453

Tokyo Monorail: 26,716 --- 1,065,799

Osaka "New Tram" (ICTS): 22,673 --- 642,727

Sapporo (HRT): 21,218 --- 740,771

Kobe "Portliner" and Rokkoliner" (ICTS): 20,915 --- 570,625

Kitakyushu-Chikuho El Ry (LRT): 20,864 --- 231,623

Osaka Monorail: 19,957 --- 243,445

Tokyo-Seibu Ry Yamaguchi Line (ICTS): 19,220 --- 143,929

Tokyo-Saitama "New Shuttle" (ICTS): 18,143 --- 403,228

San Francisco-BART (HRT): 17,324 --- 603,975

San Diego (LRT): 16,842 --- 170,463

Komaki "Peachliner" (ICTS): 16,210 --- 169,595

Tokyo-Eidan (HRT): 15,886 --- 1,359,362

St. Louis (LRT): 15,608 --- 148,734

Tokyo-Tama Monorail: 15,214 --- 338,938

Salt Lake City (LRT): 14,621 --- 100,394

Chicago (HRT): 14,042 --- 540,147

Tokyo-Toei (HRT): 13,472 --- 813,761

Sendai (HRT): 13,172 --- 467,973

Seattle Monorail: 12,941 ---- 230,062

Yokohama (HRT): 12,931 --- 644,777

Kobe (HRT): 12,685 --- 722,863

Philadelphia-PATCO (HRT): 12,675 --- 256,111

Takaoka (streetcar): 12,289 --- 43,359

Sacramento (LRT): 12,142 --- 107,866

Miami (HRT): 12,064 --- 285,048

Atlanta (HRT): 11,951 --- 468,728

Boston (HRT): 11,817 --- 543,774

Denver (LRT): 11,397 --- 102,730

New York-PATH (HRT): 11,371 --- 919,849

Shonan Monorail: 11,214 --- 285,000

Kyoto (HRT): 10,738 --- 438,902

Kitakyushu Monorail: 10,666 --- 299,091

Nagoya (HRT): 10,595 --- 684,399

Los Angeles (HRT): 10,574 --- 222,985

Washington --- DC (HRT): 10,469 --- 497,356

Osaka (HRT): 10,438 --- 926,652

New York-NYCT (HRT): 10,242 --- 1,311,062

Philadelphia-SEPTA (HRT): 10,049 --- 427,347

Los Angeles (LRT): 9,785 --- 113,622

Hakodate (streetcar): 9,745 --- 102,385

Portland (LRT): 9,686 --- 157,880

Baltimore (HRT): 9,316 --- 272,452

Chiba Monorail: 9,272 --- 175,132

Enoshima El Ry (LRT): 8,591 --- 213,400

Kumamoto (streetcar): 8,135 --- 151,818

Osaka-Sakai (streetcar): 7,931 --- 111,497

Nagasaki (streetcar): 7,917 --- 226,522

Fukuoka (HRT): 7,733 --- 437,247

Yukarigaoka (ICTS): 7,660 --- 93,415

Baltimore (LRT): 7,549 --- 91,212

Inuyama "Meitetsu Monkeyu Park Monorail": 7,351 --- 69,167

Kagoshima (streetcar): 7,351 --- 126,718

Okayama (streetcar): 7,321 --- 118,085

Boston (LRT): 7,187 --- 248,033

Cleveland (HRT): 7,175 --- 108,680

Memphis (streetcar): 7,035 --- 69,570

New Orleans (streetcar): 6,983 --- 7,820

Kochi (streetcar): 6,943 --- 88,972

New York-Staten Island (HRT): 6,880 --- 139,976

Miami-Metromover (ICTS): 6,666 --- 219,224

Cleveland (LRT): 6,477 --- 77,560

Buffalo (LRT): 6,275 --- 149,135

Hiroshima-Miyajima Line (LRT --- 1999): 6,201 --- 348,509

San Jose: 5,672 --- 79,405

Newark-Jersey City (NJT LRT): 5,470 --- 60,025

San Francisco-Muni: 5,469 --- 123,264

Jacksonville monorail: 5,464 --- 101,622

Philadelphia-SEPTA (LRT): 5,141 --- 55,675

Pittsburgh (LRT): 4,920 --- 99,711

Detroit (ICTS): 4,884 --- 253,960

Dallas (LRT): 4,282 --- 118,014

Hiroshima-Skyrail System (ICTS): 3,195 --- 51,538

Seattle Waterfront Streetcar: 2,103 --- 21,136

Nagoya-Guideway Bus: 266 --- 2,769

Again, these comparisons have not been adjusted for differences in vehicle size. Leading Japanese monorails and gadgetbahnen would decline in "rank" if this adjustment were carried out.



posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/10/2002 01:58:00 PM

 
MONORAIL FACTS AND FIGURES - 5

From the Cabalmaster:

The following list shows U.S. and Japanese fixed-guideway urban transit systems arranged by rank: annual passenger-miles per staff member, together with annual average vehicle occupancy (passenger-miles per vehicle-mile). For once the "best" is not a U.S. system. However, the vehicle-occupancy figures for some Japanese systems are much higher than any likely value for a U.S. or Canadian transit system -- rail or non-rail.

Tokyo-Eidan (HRT): 1,070,374 annual veh-mi per staff member, 67.4 pass-mi per veh-mi

Tokyo "Yurikamome" (ICTS): 1,029,274 --- 24.3

Tokyo Monorail: 887,927 --- 33.2

Tokyo-Toei (HRT): 852,101 --- 63.2

Sapporo (HRT): 726,108 --- 34.2

Kobe (HRT): 677,233 --- 53.4

Osaka Monorail: 659,119 --- 33.0

Yokohama (HRT): 615,755 --- 47.6

Osaka "New Tram" (ICTS): 605,248 --- 26.7

St. Louis (LRT): 588,436 --- 37.7

Fukuoka (HRT): 564,856 --- 73.0

Sendai (HRT): 564,460 --- 42.9

Osaka (HRT): 526,425 --- 50.4

Kyoto (HRT): 495,976 --- 46.2

Hiroshima "Astram Line" (ICTS): 488,718 --- 14

Salt Lake City (LRT): 482,254 --- 33.0

Nagoya (HRT): 478,318 --- 45.1

Tokyo-Tama Monorail: 459,022 --- 30.2

San Diego (LRT): 447,194 --- 26.6

Los Angeles (LRT): 438,615 --- 44.8

Kobe "Portliner" and Rokkoliner" (ICTS): 372,234 --- 15.1

San Francisco-BART (HRT): 357,516 --- 20.6

Yokohama "Kanazawa Seaside Line" (ICTS): 345,424 --- 11.6

Osaka-OTS Line (ICTS): 305,474 --- 8.1

New York-PATH (HRT): 289,454 --- 25.5

Philadelphia-PATCO (HRT): 288,341 --- 22.7

Kitakyushu-Chikuho El Ry (LRT): 286,396 --- 13.7

Tokyo-Saitama "New Shuttle" (ICTS): 283,427 --- 15.6

Atlanta (HRT): 279,066 --- 23.4

Boston (HRT): 271,031 --- 22.9

Portland (LRT): 270,053 --- 27.9

New York-NYCT (HRT): 263,660 --- 25.7

Washington, DC (HRT): 258,333 --- 24.7

Chicago (HRT): 253,148 --- 18.0

Sacramento (LRT): 250,640 --- 20.6

Philadelphia-SEPTA (HRT): 247,806 --- 24.7

Kitakyushu Monorail: 236,526 --- 22.2

Chiba Monorail: 235,025 --- 25.3

Miami (HRT): 221,859 --- 18.4

Los Angeles (HRT): 221,485 --- 20.9

Denver (LRT): 220,490 --- 19.3

Shonan Monorail: 211,686 --- 18.9

Enoshima El Ry (LRT): 201,216 --- 23.4

Nagasaki (streetcar): 200,019 --- 25.3

Hakodate (streetcar): 193,964 --- 19.9

Cleveland (HRT): 187,661 --- 26.2

Boston (LRT): 179,461 --- 25.0

Baltimore (LRT): 163,233 --- 21.6

Kumamoto (streetcar): 160,910 --- 19.8

Baltimore (HRT): 155,834 --- 16.7

Kagoshima (streetcar): 155,490 --- 21.2

Osaka-Sakai (streetcar): 142,661 --- 18.0

Seattle Monorail: 138,577 --- 10.7

San Francisco-Muni (LRT): 137,922 --- 25.2

New Orleans (streetcar): 137,341 --- 19.7

Cleveland (LRT): 133,900 --- 20.7

Takaoka (streetcar): 130,763 --- 10.6

Tokyo-Seibu Ry Yamaguchi Line (ICTS): 125,997 --- 6.6

Hiroshima-Miyajima Line (LRT, 1999): 124,987 --- 20.2

Buffalo (LRT): 108,264 --- 17.3

Dallas (LRT): 106,544 --- 24.9

Philadelphia-SEPTA (LRT): 102,582 --- 20.0

Okayama (streetcar): 91,652 --- 12.5

Pittsburgh (LRT): 89,556 --- 18.2

Newark-Jersey City (NJT LRT): 88,720 --- 16.2

New York-Staten Island (HRT): 88,059 --- 12.8

Kochi (streetcar): 85,710 --- 12.3

San Jose (LRT): 83,742 --- 14.8

Komaki "Peachliner" (ICTS): 58,577 --- 3.6

Inuyama "Meitetsu Monkeyu Park Monorail": 49,502 --- 6.7

Yukarigaoka (ICTS): 29,840 --- 3.9

Miami-Metromover (ICTS): 29,782 --- 4.5

Seattle Waterfront Streetcar: 23,277 --- 11.1

Memphis (streetcar): 23,194 --- 3.3

Detroit (ICTS): 22,868 --- 4.7

Jacksonville monorail: 6,273 --- 1.1

Nagoya-Guideway Bus: 4,063 --- 15.3

Hiroshima-Skyrail System (ICTS): 3,485 --- 1.1


posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 8/09/2002 04:16:00 PM