Informed but opinionated commentary and analysis on urban transportation topics from the Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal. Names have been omitted to protect the guilty.

Our Mission: Monkeywrench the Anti-Transit Forces

 
KITAKYUSHU - KITAKYUSHU MONORAIL (Monorail 23)

"It is the unfortunate destiny of the ridiculous to be subject to ridicule."
James Howard Kunstler

From the Cabalmaster:

KITAKYUSHU - KITAKYUSHU MONORAIL (Monorail 23)

(See: www.kitakyushu-monorail.co.jp.)

Supported system, Kokura to Kikugaoka, 5.5 mi. Through fare: $2.40.
40 cars, 10 four-car trains.
Maximum train length: four cars.

Scheduled running time between terminals:19 minutes
Schedule speed: 17 mph.
Maximum permitted speed is 40 mph.

Service:
6 am to 11:30 pm.
Every 6-10 min throughout most of the day.

Weekdays: 103 "down" (Kikugaoka) trains; 103 "up" (Kokura) trains.

Sundays/holidays: 94 "down" and 93 "up" trains.

The "Kitakyushu Rapid Railway Co, Ltd, Kokura Line," aka the Kitakyushu Monorail, was the first "urban transit" monorail in Japan. It was also the first supported monorail built following adoption of design standards (by the Japan Monorail Association) and application criteria. The Tokyo Monorail was built as an "airport-access railway," and this remains its primary function. Many overseas monorail enthusiasts credit the Kitakyushu Monorail for sparking a "revival" of the mode in Japan. The Japanese have a different view [and we opinionated TransitCabalists concur!]. The second stage of monorail development in Japan is considered to have started with the Shonan Monorail. (There could hardly be a "revival" for a mode that never fell out of favor, but instead resembled a "solution in search of a problem" for many years.)

No two cities are exactly alike, but Kitakyushu (pronounced more or less as "key-tuh-cue-shoe") stands out as unique. It grew up as Japan's major steel town -- and as five separate cities that were not amalgamated until 1963. It sprawls over more than 20 miles east to west. Heavy industry has become less important in recent years, but Kitakyushu retains a highly industrialized cityscape.

Until the end of the '70s, Kitakyushu had one of the busiest, fastest, most efficient and best-maintained streetcar systems in Japan, operated by the Nishi-Nippon Railroad Co, Ltd ("Nishitetsu;" pronounced something like "Nish-tets"). It remained at its largest extent long after other large Japanese urban tramways had been curtailed or replaced. But it could not withstand a prolonged, inexorable decline in traffic, owing to population shifts and declines in industrial employment levels. The first bus substitution took place in 1980 an the last vestige was closed near the end of 2000, leaving a suburban "express tramway" (the Chikuho Electric Railroad Co, Ltd, a Nishitetsu subsidiary) built in 1953-1959.

Railbound competition was not a significant factor when the standard-gauge trunk streetcar system was built (1911-1929). That changed abruptly in 1961, when JNR electrified its Kagoshima Main Line. Today, JR-Kyushu operates three local and three "rapid-service" trains per hour through Kitakyushu, a "rapid-transit" service in all but name. These trains achieve passenger speeds exceeding 30 mph.

Another significant development in Kitakyushu was a rapid increase in auto ownership together with a dispersal of population from "close-in" districts. Auto ownership grew from one per 5.5 households to one per 1.1 households between 1963 and 1980. Meanwhile, manufacturing employment declined by nearly 30 percent. In part, this reflected large productivity gains from large-scale use of industrial robots. JNR managed to gain passengers within Kitakyushu; boardings within the city limit increased by 38 percent. But bus traffic fell by 16 percent, and streetcar traffic plummeted by nearly 50 percent.

Meanwhile, new suburban development south of Kokura, the business-center "hub" of Kitakyushu, created a need for improved transportation. The city's "original" streetcar line opened with horse traction in 1906 and electrified in 1920, extended 2.8 miles southward from Kokura to Kitagata; a short-lived (1923-1925) horsecar line once extended 1.9 miles farther south to Tokuriki. Planners decided against a streetcar extension. The slow (11 mph schedule speed), narrow-gauge Kitagata Line, built in narrow streets, could not provide the needed capacity. However, forecast traffic levels were not high enough to justify a subway. The logical mode choice: monorail.

Construction of a monorail line extending 5.2 miles southward from Kokura was authorized by the Transport Ministry in 1976. The Kitakyushu city government organized a third-sector company, Kitakyushu Rapid Railway Co, Ltd, with 75 percent of the stock held by the city. The Nishi-Nippon Railroad Co. holds about 10 percent of the stock. Nippon Steel Corp, Kyushu Electric Power Co, and Sumitomo Metal Industries each hold about three percent.

Construction started in 1978, and the line opened in 1985. A short (0.3-mile) extension at Kokura brought monorail trains to a new terminal, in the new Kokura station complex, in 1998.

The monorail was built over a newly-widened street in central Kokura, where it is supported by T-shaped pillars. The middle portion is built beneath the roadway deck of an elevated express highway. Much more massive pillars support the monorail, and the highway above. The southern, outer portion was built over a new road in an area of new suburban development. This portion is quite scenic, with views of the mountains in the distance.

A 1982 magazine article stated the estimated construction cost at 5.14 billion yen (roughly $350 million in today's dollars), with "infrastructure" (the guideway) accounting for 45 percent of this. A subway was estimated to cost three times this amount. The actual cost was about 35 percent higher, about $470 million.

(The Japanese perspective on this "overrun" might read something like this: "The monorail was built as a less costly alternative to a subway, which would have cost three times more. It is known that large construction projects cost more to build than initial estimates suggest. This is regrettable, but inevitable. The "gap" can be managed, but not eliminated, and would occur regardless of mode choice. A 35 percent increase from five billion yen is a much smaller
amount than a similar increase from 15 billion yen.")

The line has 11 intermediate stations. Platforms have barriers with gaps at door locations -- precise spotting of trains is customary in Japan. The operating base is located a short distance beyond the outer terminal, Kikugaoka. As usual in Japan, the Kitakyushu Monorail has a stage fare system. The minimum fare, for 1/4 mile, is $1.25.

The line is equipped with CTC and ATO for driver-only operation, and was Japan's first "major" monorail with one-man operation of trains. Traction current is 1500V dc.

CTC and ATO stand for "Centralized Traffic Control" and "Automatic Train Operation," respectively. These are historic acronyms. Current reality is best described as 1.) computer-controlled dispatching, 2.) A computerized "fail-safe" or "oversight" that displays maximum permitted speed over each section, and monitors acceleration, speed, braking and so forth in order to prevent unsafe operation. The electronics could, if necessary, provide for driverless or unmanned operation. A few Japanese gadgetbahnen operate without drivers, but most do not.

1.) The Kitakyushu Monorail is clean, quiet, well-built and well-run; it also returns an operating surplus equal to about 15 percent of revenue. By every measure, it is a success.

2.) There is no prospect for expansion.

To the American monorail buff, 1.) and 2.) are a contradiction in terms, and this "proves" that all the other information on this blog is absolute . . . well, you know . . .

[We opinionated transit pundits ARE opinionated, but open to persuasion, and the following explanation did the trick.]

The Mayor of Kitakyushu -- who may also serve as president of the monorail company, the typical practice for municipal "third-sector" enterprises -- might explain that the monorail was built because better transport was needed, but the cost of a subway could not be justified. He might also explain that the monorail was not built with expansion in mind. It could be extended at either end, in fact, a short extension was built when the reconstruction of Kokura station justified this. He might continue that monorails are not suitable for operation in a network, integrated with other monorail lines. Where such a network is needed, some other mode would be built.

"And so," a visitor might ask, "Would a city choose monorail as the first "stage" of an eventual integrated network, with vehicles traveling from one line to another?"

The likely (polite) answer, in Japanese, gets translated as "perhaps not;" it is the functional equivalent of "I do not believe so, but I cannot guarantee this."

An outline map dating to the opening of the line shows two "future" lines. Japan makes such plans far in advance, but are not implemented until "decisionmakers" reach a consensus that the project is necessary and its expense can be justified. Hence, these are best understood as "possible" future lines, for which provisions will be made as other projects are built.

[In other words, other projects may not obstruct a potential future transport corridor. In the Los Angeles area, Caltrans once threatened to do just that, on grounds that it "didn't have the money" to build an overpass, rather than an embankment, across a rail alignment. The road project was the Century Freeway . . . and the rail alignment eventually became the light rail Blue Line!]

A monorail line extending southwest from Kurosaki, in the western part of the city, would roughly parallel the Chikuho express tramway mentioned above. Traffic may eventually grow to justify a second line. [The key word here is "eventually."]

A monorail line between Kokura and Kurosaki would duplicate the only section of the standard-gauge streetcar network not paralleled by JNR (now JR-Kyushu). [The key word here is "duplicate."]

The plan for a Kokura --- Kurosaki monorail line dates to the mid-'80s, and probably farther back. The streetcar line was closed in 1992. It seem safe to conclude that this line will not be built until traffic becomes too heavy for buses -- and that, in our opinion, is a long way ahead.


posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 10/31/2002 02:27:00 PM

 
PRIVATE-SECTOR FINANCING? (Japan Monorail 22)

"It is the unfortunate destiny of the ridiculous to be subject to ridicule."
James Howard Kunstler

From the Cabalmaster:

(Sorry for the long hiatus--the Seattle Monorail fiasco took up much of our time in the last few weeks).

PRIVATE-SECTOR FINANCING?

The following elaboration of the alleged "private-sector" financing of Japanese monorails makes very interesting reading. As one source tells us, "Much of what seems 'inscrutable' about Japan actually makes perfect sense -- if you can discern the underlying logic."

In Japan, ruled by avowed conservatives for most of the post-WWII era, "the system" discourages "subsidies" but accepts debt. The Japanese financial system is very reluctant to acknowledge "bad" (unrecoverable) debt and to write it off. Banks keep much bad debt "on the books," under the polite fiction that someday, it will be paid off. The public sector also does this, because writing off the debt issued to build something is the same as paying for it out of tax revenues -- in other words, a subsidy.

Contrary to what many outsiders believe, most of the "private investment" in monorails, gadgets and rail projects is not "risk capital" at all. It is secured borrowing from the private sector.

"Infrastructure" is paid for by government "grants." A considerable chunk of this money is raised by government debt issues.

Rolling stock and other facilities are financed by something resembling an "equipment trust" arrangement by the municipal agency. But, instead of "equipment trust certificates," the agency issues shares of stock.

[This sounds strange if not bizarre at first, but the following example helps clarify things.]

Suppose the City of Los Angeles wanted to use a Japanese-style joint venture bewteen private and public sectors to finance a westward extension of the Red Line subway.

It would organize the "Wilshire Boulevard Rapid Transit Company, Ltd" as a for-profit corporation, identical in organization to the private-sector model. There would, however, be a twist: all shares would, at first, be held by government agencies: L.A. City, L.A. County, Beverly Hills and Santa Monica.

The company would finance construction of the tunnel, from Western to the ocean. They would raise the money from state and federal grants, and from "local" funds. But the local share would actually be borrowed from the private sector.

In financial terms, this would work as follows: The stock represents the capitalized value of the company, which is set at the minimum level required for the intended amount of borrowing.

[We assume that this "initial capitalization" is backed, at least nominally, by public assets or tax revenues.]

Each government entity holds a percentage of the stock. Under an arrangement that uses this equity as collateral, with a lot of "leveraging," the three cities and the county borrow money from the private sector. Private lenders get municipal and county debt (bonds), but not stock.

"Infrastructure" represents a "sunk" cost, unrecoverable in case of liquidation. That is, if the facility were to be abandoned, very little of the amount invested in infrastructure could be recovered for other uses. "Risk" capital is seldom available for large-scale (equity) investments of this type, so the majority of the project cost must be financed with debt. Taxpayers pay to service this debt, at least at first.

In contrast to "infrastructure," track, power facilities, station equipment and rolling stock do have "residual" value that could be recovered (at least in theory) upon liquidation. And so, L.A. city sells stock to banks and other private investors, and uses the money to pay for trains and other "equipment."

This money does not represent "venture" or "risk" capital, for reasons that will elude those who cling to rigid definitions of categories such as "stock" and "bonds." In brief, the instruments in question are called "stock," and legally are stock, but do not behave like stock." Capital appreciation" (i.e. stock price goes up) is possible in theory but is usually a polite fiction. Return on investment is paid as "dividends" rather than "interest." Dividends are nice but payment is not "required; " that is, non-payment of dividends does not lead to "default." The promised dividend payments are set to provide a rate of return acceptable to the lender.

[Since we know that banks buy and sell debt, we shouldn't be surprised that banks (and other "institutional" investors such as insurance companies) also buy and sell this type of "stock." It also helps to know that Japan currently has very low interest rates, owing to its long recession, so these "dividends" can be nominal.]

In some cases, local enterprises that benefit (or can be persuaded that they will benefit) from the project will purchase stock. However, this usually doesn't happen with new urban transit projects. The financing arrangement provides a convenient channel for "supplier financing," which does happen with monorails and other gadgets.

Things really get interesting from opening day. The Japanese-style "Wilshire Boulevard Rapid Transit Co" would have its own rolling stock and staff -- and its own ("stage," or distance-based!) fare structure. Trains would operate through between Union Station and Santa Monica, but passengers would have to pay a "double" fare for travel to and from points west of the LACMTA interchange, Wilshire/Western.

Do those Wilshire fares seem kinda high? Well, yes, they were explicitly set that way in order to recover some of the construction cost.

What goes on in the accounting office is REALLY interesting. In brief, a portion of operating revenues is paid as "dividends" to the private lenders who hold part of the company's stock. Another share of revenues may be allocated as "dividends" payable to the cities. The remainder pays all, or some, of the operating cost.

"Dividends" paid to cities may be used to service some of the municipal debt issued to build the "infrastructure." With creative accounting, they could also be used to cover operating deficits (which would require that the line earn enough revenue to cover all operating costs AND the share of "dividends" paid to private lenders.

Operating deficits may also be covered by debt issues, with interest charged against the next year's operating budget. This creates a mountain of debt in a hurry. As an alternative, operating deficits may be paid from other funds, with each year's deficit charged to an account called "cumulative loss." This represents money that will eventually be paid back as traffic grows.

Hence the typical projection along these lines: "the facility will become profitable after 10 years of operation, and all accumulated losses will be paid back after 20 years."

But this doesn't matter to private lenders as much as the implicit "guarantee" by the municipality that the promised payments will be made.

Of course, if the projections don't pass muster with the central government, the required "infrastructure" grants will not be provided.

THIS is "private-sector" financing??? We don't think so -- but you know we're opinionated!




posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 10/31/2002 02:23:00 PM

 
Another Point About Seattle Monorail

"It is the unfortunate destiny of the ridiculous to be subject to ridicule."
James Howard Kunstler

From the Cabalmaster:

This graphic, sent to the Opinionated Ones by our friends at www.citizensagainstthemonorail.org makes another quite valid point we forgot to mention in our epic 14-part screed.

Enjoy.

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 10/30/2002 02:39:00 PM

 
Check Facts Before Pulling Out Flamethrower

"It is the unfortunate destiny of the ridiculous to be subject to ridicule."
James Howard Kunstler

From the Cabalmaster:

We've heard that one of our favorite critics is firing up his flamethrower over an earlier post, in which we hinted that Los Angeles is named for the Virgin Mary.

Our "friend," whom we've dubbed the "Nattering Nebish of Napalm," might want to consider the following: it's true. L.A. was founded as "El Pueblo de Nuestra Señora de los Angeles de la Porciúncula." In other words, "The town of Our Lady, Queen of Angels . . ." The Catholic Archdiocese of Los Angeles explains this at www.la-archdiocese.org/Framein/lahisten.htm.)

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 10/30/2002 02:10:00 PM

 
SEATTLE PART 14: IT'S THE WATER . . . AND WHO KNOWS WHAT ELSE

"It is the unfortunate destiny of the ridiculous to be subject to ridicule."
James Howard Kunstler

From the Cabalmaster:

SEATTLE PART 14: IT'S THE WATER . . . AND WHO KNOWS WHAT ELSE

Continued coverage of the Seattle monorail plan from the Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal:

You may have gathered that your Favorite Transit Pundits are mono-skeptics. We are, and we want to reiterate why. Very simply: the technology choice was made first. Then the route was selected.

In other words, "let's build a monorail, now where do we put it?" Sorta like buying a train set, then deciding where to set it up. Except that this particular train set has a $2 billion price tag.

Not only that: The proposed monorail route was not selected to serve the "priority" travel corridors identified by more than two decades of planning. Instead, the Crown Hill - Ballard - downtown - West Seattle route was outlined explicitly to avoid conflict with the Sound Transit "Central Link" light-rail project -- which does serve one of the priority corridors (two, once funding is secured).

In short, the monorail proposal is totally divorced from anything resembling good planning.

There are many comical, wacky, and just plain bizarre elements of the Seattle monorail story. It will long be remembered as the wildest tale in transit history. We've been amazed, amused and, on occasion, disgusted -- but that's beside our point. Take all this away, and we'd still be mono-skeptics.

One more thing. Anti-rail factions have joined monorail boosters the hopes of torpedoing the Sound Transit project. Another "front" in this "battle" is the pending lawsuit to force a "revote" on the light-rail plan. As we've reported, a King County Superior Court judge said he would issue a ruling by the end of October (whatever the court decides, we anticipate an appeal). A vote for monorail, so the argument goes, is a vote against light rail. Washington State's inimitable initiatives guru, Tim Eyman, makes the same argument for his latest proposal, Initiative 776, on the November ballot statewide.

This "reasoning" overlooks the obvious. Given any semblance of community interest, it doesn't take much to qualify an initiative for the Seattle ballot. This can be accomplished with breathtaking speed, as monorail enthusiasts demonstrated in summer 2002. A non-binding "no-confidence" measure, approved by a convincing majority, would put the Sound Transit board in a precarious position. Companion "no-confidence" votes in other cities within the Sound Transit district would create political pressure that the board could probably not resist. Of course, this strategy might backfire on rail opponents; we're certain they know this and are not willing to take the risk.

University of Washington Professor Emeritus Folke Nyberg continues to promote his "freeway monorail" idea seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorialsopinion/134558835_folke21.html", undaunted by continued criticism from the state's Transportation Secretary
seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorialsopinion/134563289_sunlets27.html; scroll down to "Up in the air."

We don't have a high opinion of Seattle media outlets, but sometimes, we're pleasantly surprised. The "Ballard News-Tribune," a neighborhood paper, published a remarkably balanced story titled simply "On route, monorail support mixed" (Ballard News-Tribune, October 3, 2002).

(For websurfers unfamiliar with Seattle, Ballard is a long-established neighborhood northwest of downtown that was once a separate city. Although absorbed by Seattle nearly 100 years ago, Ballard retains a strong local identity.)

Excerpts:

" . . . people who live, work and own businesses along 15th Avenue have very different reactions to what the monorail holds in store for their section of Ballard.

" Most support the plan, and think a monorail will be a tool for development and economic prosperity. Others oppose the measure, either because they don’t believe a monorail will spur development, or they fear it will. And some, whether they plan to vote for or against it, don’t believe a monorail system will get built at all."

The article also contained brief interviews with a number of people. A sample:

“'If I vote for it, I’m part of the problem. If I vote against it, I’m part of the problem,' says Gretchen Tuomi, a commercial loan officer at HomeStreet Bank.

The "News Tribune" sponsored an "information forum" early in October to discuss the monorail. This featured a four-member panel; the two ETC representatives included the mono-guru himself, Dick Falkenbury.

According to an FOC, the major monorail issue "downtown" is obstruction of views by columns, beams and stations, and drips and falling objects from monorail structures to sidewalks and streets below. In residential areas, the major issue is lack of parking and concerns that bus service will be reduced.

A source who attended the forum tells us that most in attendance were taken aback to hear Dick Falkenbury's outline of monorail station issues: these should fit in with each neighborhood, each will get what it wants, and in time stations will "change" to meet neighborhood "needs."

We understand that ETC plans to retain one Clark Kent as its director of station assembly and relocation . . .

Our source tells us that pointed questions and comments from the forum included:

"This project is going to go over budget. I don't believe you folks when you say that it won't. You're never going to build this for $1.7 billion. My question is: are you going to go back to the voters or are you going to shorten the line when this happens?"

"I came here tonight uncertain about how I was going to vote. But I've decided to vote against this because you people refuse to answer any questions straightforwardly."

"Where are the opposing points of view on this panel?"

"I read this Seattle Weekly article and it implicates the URS firm that did your ridership saying the numbers are completely off base."

"Why would we spend $2 billion to replace bus service from the 15 and 18 buses."

One more thing: According to a King County Metro source, as relayed by an FOC, the three principal bus routes between downtown Seattle and Ballard average little more than 11,000 passengers per weekday. That is a remarkably weak ridership base on which to build a costly facility like the monorail.

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 10/29/2002 06:06:00 PM

 
SEATTLE PART 13: IT'S THE WATER . . . AND WHO KNOWS WHAT ELSE

"It is the unfortunate destiny of the ridiculous to be subject to ridicule."
James Howard Kunstler

From the Cabalmaster:

SEATTLE PART 13: IT'S THE WATER . . . AND WHO KNOWS WHAT ELSE

Continued coverage of Seattle's Monorail Media Wars from your Favorite Transit Pundits.

Seattle's architects are divided on the monorail; some support the plan while others fear that monorail structures will impede views, make streets less pedestrian-friendly create urban blight
seattlepi.nwsource.com/transportation/91672_architecture18.shtml. The chair of the Seattle Design Commission called in early September for computer-simulation videos or an actual mock-up to "inform the public about the physical reality" of the project seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/85585_monorail05.shtml. A "town meeting" in late October attracted 140 PAYING spectators ($5 per head -- we hope that a certain well-known consulting firm doesn't hear about this idea!) to hear a debate on monorail aesthetics seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/134560703_monodebate23m.html. A previous town meeting, featuring a debate on ridership and costs, attracted 90 people.

Seattle's monorail infatuation has attracted attention from the national media, including National Public Radio and the Christian Science Monitor www.csmonitor.com/2002/0821/p03s01-usgn.html; see also 216.239.51.100/search?q=cache:yiZ1vFhQjM0C:www.csmonitor.com/search_content/0826/p08s02-cole.html+Christian+Science+Monitor+Seattle+Monorail&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

Various monorail critics and opponents complained bitterly that the media treated the monorail plan as if it were "Home on the Range:" Seldom was heard a discouraging word (even if the skies were cloudy at times). Then, early in September, the first round of CAM's television ads began to appear archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=antimonorail05m&date=20020905. The media seemed almost in denial at first seattlepi.nwsource.com/transportation/85763_paynter06.shtml, and some still manage to ignore the trend. However, as we've described before, poll results suggest substantial erosion of support since late September. By late October, polls showed a lack of "critical mass." Tax measures generally do not pass unless pre-election polls show a secure margin of at least 55 percent in favor, and a relatively small share of "undecided" responses. A large share of "undecideds" -- up to 9 out of 10 -- eventually turn into "no" votes. Seattle media missed the story, but rejection of the monorail plan appeared the more likely outcome at least two weeks before the election.

The October 20 "Seattle Times" featured a point-counterpoint pair of columns by Mike Layton, a freelance writer and journalist (pro; archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=layton20&date=20021020&query=monorail) and Richard Borkowski, president of People for Modern Transit, which promotes walking, cycling and light rail (anti; archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=nomonorail20&date=20021020&query=monorail)

An FOC amplifies the latter column by pointing out that automated lines in Detroit, Jacksonville and Miami recover only a "miniscule" percentage of operating costs from fare. Conventional rail systems have much higher cost-recovery ratios, such as Washington, DC, Metrorail (70 percent) and the San Diego Trolley (67 percent). In Canada, the automated Vancouver Skytrain system carries 130,000 passengers per weekday, but Calgary, with conventional LRT, attracts more boardings per route-mile.

The "Seattle Post-Intelligencer" also ran a pair of "point-counterpoint" columns on October 20, by Tom Carr and Kristina Hill (pro; seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/91314_monorailpro20.shtml), and by Henry Aronson, former Port commissioner and head of the opposition group Citizens Against the Monorail (anti; seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/91313_monorailcon20.shtml).

Another FOC reports that Aronson also opposes light rail, and that the arguments advanced in his column resemble those he uses against light rail. Aronson evidently never met a highway plan he didn't like.

Monorail supporters repeated in mid-October their intent to develop a 50-mile citywide network over 20 years seattlepi.nwsource.com/transportation/92138_monorail21.shtml but, as usual, money remains the major uncertainty. We doubt that a city the size of Seattle has the necessary tax base to finance expansion of this magnitude with local funds. Prospects for federal funding are, at best, limited.

Citizens Against Monorail sought to obtain various ETC documents through the state public-disclosure procedure, then went to court to obtain other documents and e-mail transcripts, including personal e-mail and computer records of ETC officials. On October 21, the opposition scored: a King County Superior Court judge ordered ETC to turn over the materials. seattlepi.nwsource.com/transportation/92338_monorail22.shtml. This action was justified, opponents said, because ETC officials used personal e-mail addresses and computers while assembling the plan submitted to voters. ETC responded that it had voluntarily handed over more than 100,000 pages of documents, withholding 1,000 pages dealing with personnel matters or confidential legal advice. The monorail campaign manager said the opposition was simply trying to raise last-minute doubts.

ETC's executive director said that the agency would appeal; the Superior Court judge stayed his order to permit this. On October 23, an appellate court commissioner ruled that ETC did not have to turn over the requested documents since the court did not have time to review each document seattlepi.nwsource.com/transportation/92631_monorail24.shtml.

A monorail skeptic and FOC (“Friend of the Cabal,” = “Fellow Traveler”) believes that the tax increases necessary to pay for the project would drive local businesses out of Seattle. This FOC also notes that ETC could not receive a federal bailout without performing an alternatives analysis -- one that would pass muster with FTA, we add.

However, some business interests do support the monorail -- or, at least, have made strategic campaign contributions seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/134560540_monodonors23m.html. By October 21, the pro-monorail campaign reported $367,053 in cash and donated labor. The donor list includes corporate heavy hitters such as Starbucks, Goldman Sachs, the Seattle Mariners baseball team ("heavy hitters" . . . get it?), Microsoft billionaire Paul Allen's Vulcan, Bombardier and "numerous engineering and construction firms." (The last items ought to raise an eyebrow or two).

Of the 507 reported donations, 381 were for $100 or less. Other contributors tossed dollar bills in a fishbowl outside the homes of ETC Chairman Tom Weeks and monorail activist Cleve Stockmeyer, who have hosted weekend parties.

In contrast, Citizens Against the Monorail reported 64 donations of cash and labor worth $29,830. Opponents look like underdogs . . . until one takes a thoughtful look at the polls.

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 10/29/2002 05:56:00 PM

 
SEATTLE PART 12: IT'S THE WATER . . . AND WHO KNOWS WHAT ELSE

"It is the unfortunate destiny of the ridiculous to be subject to ridicule."
James Howard Kunstler

From the Cabalmaster:

SEATTLE PART 12: IT'S THE WATER . . . AND WHO KNOWS WHAT ELSE

The Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal continues its coverage of Seattle's Monorail Media Wars.

"FORD TO CITY: DROP DEAD" ("New York Daily News," October 30, 1975)

"BUILD THE MONORAIL, DAMMIT!" ("The Stranger," July 13-19, 2000)

The headlines were classic, but the series of articles published by "The Stranger" www.thestranger.com/2000-07-13/feature.html was less memorable. For websurfers unfamiliar with Seattle, "The Stranger" is a "lefty" free weekly, that, as one Friend of the Cabal (FOC) put it, has about as much credibility as the "National Enquirer." It also makes a point about living up to its image, being "strange."

We Opinionated Ones note with interest that the first local media outlet to begin asking pointed questions about the monorail (after a fashion, anyway) was Seattle's OTHER free weekly, the ( . . . you guessed it . . . ) "Seattle Weekly" www.seattleweekly.com/features/0232/news-howland2.shtml. This put a different "spin" on the light rail v. monorail theme:

"For the last six years, I have written, edited, and read hundreds of articles about the slow, terrible implosion of light rail. Every time I think it cannot possibly get any worse, it does: cost overruns in the hundreds of millions; tunnel disasters on Capitol Hill and in the Rainier Valley; staff resignations; federal fund retractions; route changes; fewer riders; more costs; rejection by the Tukwila City Council!"

"Now when I think about spending $1.7 billion for 14 miles of monorail, I think: complicated, expensive, risky. Can Seattle actually move forward with a [mono]rail line in 2002?"

". . . What we need here is a group of intelligent, hostile opponents who have some power over this project and will pick every nit and turn over every rock. Fortunately, we have them: the Seattle City Council. . . . Unfortunately, the council members seem a bit timid. This is probably because previous efforts by the City Council to kill the monorail backfired--resulting in Initiative 53 (I-53), which funded the development of the current monorail plan.

"Their hesitancy also results from the monorail proponents telling our elected representatives essentially to butt out. 'We've briefed the full City Council several times. They've asked us many questions. I-53 says they are supposed to refer our plan to the ballot,' says [ETC board chair Tom] Weeks.

"King County Council member Dwight Pelz, D-Seattle, is one of the few elected officials with the guts to call bullshit on this bum's rush. 'It's time to ask hard questions. I've been a little bit amazed that the monorail people have tried to intimidate the City Council into not asking questions.'"

"As Pelz so rightly observes, 'We debate everything to hell in Seattle, why not the monorail?'"

Nearly two months later, a "Post-Intelligencer" columnist blasted the monorail plan as "a waste of time and money" seattlepi.nwsource.com/connelly/89741_joel04.shtml. Demonstrating the existence of at least SOME intelligent life at the "P-I."

THE BATTLE LINES ARE DRAWN

Two monorail critics filed paperwork in early August for Citizens Against Monorail, a campaign organization eattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/134509852_antimonorail09m.html. Co-treasurers were Henry Aronson, a former Port of Seattle commissioner, and Jack Mackie, a Seattle Design Commission member. Other CAM members include: former Seattle Public Utilities director Diana Gale, former City Councilwoman Dolores Sibonga, University of Washington architecture professor Jeffrey Ochnser and UW professor emeritus Folke Nyberg. (Nyberg has monorail ambitions of his own: freewaymonorail.org/news.htm; see also archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=folke21&date=20021021&query=monorail.)

Monorail opponents said the line would depress downtown land values, block views, fail to solve traffic congestion and that the plan amounts to a "blank check" drawn on taxpayers seattlepi.nwsource.com/transportation/82012_monorail09.shtml.

Aronson labeled the plan as "a fantasy in the air, adding, "This may well be WPPSS on wheels." (WPPSS, pronounced "whoops," refers to the failed Washington Public Power Supply System nuclear power program of the 1980s.)

The ever-enthusiastic Falkenbury responded, " . . . The fact that [the monorail] doesn't do everything for everybody is a ridiculous nonreason to not begin building a solution." (Untie that syntax, Dick; sounds like there ARE reasons NOT to build the monorail!)

Falkenbury also urged monorail supporters to be courteous. (How "Seattle!")

The organization formed to campaign for monorail approval is "Monorail Yes! Campaign." Its co-chair, Peter Sherwin, admitted that the monorail would obstruct some views but would create "fantastic views" for passengers.

Monorail opponents (and some FOCs) have complained that ETC has violated campaign ethics laws by using public funds to promote the monorail plan. ETC's promotion efforts have been extensive, including two-page spreads in the two major newspapers. We've been advised that monorail opponents have complained to Seattle municipal authorities (the reported response: the bureaucrat(s) "saw no violation").

We're opinionated (that's why you like this blog, isn't it? :-) ), and we think that monorail opponents were off on a tangent on this particular issue. Campaign-ethics laws of this type -- and enforcement of same -- are not uniform. Generally, it's acceptable to use public funds to "inform" voters, but not to "persuade" them. Granted, there is a broad gray area between the two, but "promotion" does not automatically work out to "persuasion."

We acknowledge that ETC would have been hauled into court and gagged long ago in certain semi-feudal domains. (Anyone familiar with the recent transit election in San Antonio can guess which semi-feudal domain we're thinking of!) However . . .

Washington State also has an unfortunate tradition of ignoring laws that might interfere with what the political class wants to do -- or jeopardize prospects for re-election. (For example, local and state officials literally turned and looked the other way in 1990 when the Breda-built articulated dual-mode buses turned out to exceed axleweight limits with just a single passenger on board.) A campaign-ethics action against ETC would trigger howls of protest (and possible retribution at the next election) even if there were a "smoking gun" in the form of overt persuasion. ETC literature has a lot of glowing (and unrealistic) claims, but fails the "persuasion" test. (It fails to persuade us in any case!)

With regard to ethics violations, "The Stranger" went off the deep end in mid-August www.thestranger.com/2002-08-15/city4.html. A "shocking-expose" type story suggested that the presence of a FORMER aide to King County Executive Ron Sims among the anti-monorail campaigners suggested that local officials were working behind the scenes against the monorail. (Check out the story . . . we Opinionated Ones are NOT making any of this up!)

Professor Vukan R. Vuchic of the University of Pennsylvania, one of the world's leading authorities on public transit wrote a guest column for the "Seattle Times" in mid-August seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorialsopinion/134516659_vukan19.html.

"[The] historic connection with monorail technology may explain why this debate has been resurrected in Seattle decades after this transit system was rejected by many cities around the world. However, sentimental attachment makes a poor basis for selecting a transit system for the future of the Puget Sound region." Vuchic also noted that "Very few cities, mostly in Japan, have built monorails as a transit line." (You read our blog, so you know all about Japanese monorails!)

Monorail supporters then discovered a new sport, so to speak: Vuchic villification seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorialsopinion/134518594_thulets22.html. No big surprise here.

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 10/29/2002 05:36:00 PM

 
SEATTLE PART 11: IT'S THE WATER . . . AND WHO KNOWS WHAT ELSE

"It is the unfortunate destiny of the ridiculous to be subject to ridicule."
James Howard Kunstler

From the Cabalmaster:

SEATTLE PART 11: IT’S THE WATER . . . AND WHO KNOWS WHAT ELSE
Continuing our coverage of Seattle's monorail plan:

It's definitely the water, and who knows what else. Well . . . maybe not.

The Seattle chapter of the League of Women Voters endorsed the monorail early in August. Then, two months later, the League took the rare step of withdrawing its endorsement and changing its position to "neutral" seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/traffic/134551928_monorail10m.html.

As we reported earlier, one of the points of contention between supporters and opponents was the ballot title seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/134542772_antimonorail26m.html; seattlepi.nwsource.com/transportation/88675_monorail26.shtml. Early in October, a King County Superior Court judge ordered most of the changes sought by opponents, who described the original title as vague, misleading and inaccurate seattlepi.nwsource.com/transportation/89814_monorail04.shtml.

In mid-October, former Seattle mayor Charles Royer announced his opposition to the monorail seattlepi.nwsource.com/transportation/91391_monorail16.shtml. Royer, who was Seattle's mayor from 1978 to 1989, said the plan was too costly and would complicate efforts to secure funding for other needs, such as replacing the earthquake-damaged Alaskan Way Viaduct.

In an October 13 editorial, the "Seattle Times" expressed its opposition to the monorail
seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorialsopinion/134553672_monoed13.html. A cartoon in this edition ("We support the monorail because . . . we're nuts") is priceless; unfortunately, it's not available online.

The "Seattle Post-Intelligencer" endorsed the monorail on the following Sunday, October 20. seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/91836_monoed.shtml. To some extent, this was probably a shot at the "Times." For those websurfers not familiar with Seattle, the two papers have a "joint operating agreement" . . . and the fact that the two publishers despise each other is well known.

Y'know, in the midst of all this monomania, wouldn't it be funny if the existing monorail suffered a breakdown . . . like a flat tire?

It's already happened. Three times. Within ten days. (No, no, no, a thousand times no, we are not making this up! seattlepi.nwsource.com/transportation/89461_monorail02.shtml)

MEDIA COVERAGE: FROM MONOMANIA TO SKEPTICISM

One of the most striking aspects about the local media coverage is the unstated assumption that monorail is, like, well . . . a transit version of "Westworld," where all your commuting fantasies come true and nothing can ever go WORNG . . . (use alternate transportation if the monorail operator bears any resemblance to Yul Brynner).

Or, as an FOC, frustrated with the lack of critical investigative reporting, puts it: ". . . an ostensibly brain-dead, fawning entourage of journalists applauds the ETC's facade of "openness" and treats their claims as unassailable scientific
revelation."

Ya sure, ya betcha!

Websurfers accustomed to the likes of the "New York Times" the "Los Angeles Times," or "60 Minutes" might consider the following observation by a long-time "Emerald City" resident:

"Seattle has no tradition of investigative journalism."

(So now you know.)

Seattle residents probably see this failing as . . . hey, no problem . . . but we'd like to hear ETC's answer to an occasional tough question. For example: if revenues fall short of projections, where would the necessary operating subsidy come from?

Another matter: a group of FOCs have checked ETC figures, and have found that ETC's adjustment of annual operating cost estimates from 2002 to 2020 implies an annual inflation rate of 1.5 percent. This, if true, is unrealistically low. Another issue: "extremely low" allowances for administration and contingencies in cosnstruction-cost estimates. Yet another issue, spotted by a sharp-eyed FOC: ETC appears to have underestimated its power costs by half. These are the sort of issues that reporters in New York, Chicago or L.A. would dive into. Not in Seattle, though.

Media coverage, letter writers and talk shows give the impression that Seattle residents have a very low threshold of tolerance for "real world" delays, cost escalations and other problems associated inevitably with billion-dollar public-works projects. If so, then Seattle has no business building anything larger than a one-room schoolhouse with public funds.

Local media have had a field day playing "good transit, bad transit:" monorail v. the "other" transit project in town -- Sound Transit's Central Link light-rail project. Here's some typical rhetoric:

"Given its history of botched designs, flagrant cost overruns and a tin ear for politics, the last thing you'd think Sound Transit would want is another audit.

"You could think that, but you'd be wrong." seattlepi.nwsource.com/transportation/85946_pot07.shtml.

"Monorail or light rail? It's a duel," proclaimed an early August "Seattle Post-Intelligencer headline seattlepi.nwsource.com/transportation/81987_versus09.shtml. The "kicker" read, "Are the monorail and light rail systems on a collision course?" Ha, ha.

The primary issue is not dueling personalities, "tension from old battles," or light rail advocates "saying bad things" about the monorail (Seattle media love to run such stories). It's not even the suitability of one mode or another for Seattle. It's the money, stupid.

ETC and Sound Transit plan construction in a different corridor, so monorail and light rail are not directly competitive. Local media remarked that Sound Transit loaned software for ridership projection to ETC, but no surprises here -- ETC and ST are public agencies, and ST could hardly refuse this type of cooperation.

There is very little chance for substitution of monorail for light rail in the "Central Link" corridor, where various modal alternatives have already been considered. There's an even slimmer chance for substitution of light rail for monorail in the Crown Hill - Ballard - downtown - West Seattle corridor, owing to lack of available rights of way. A mass transit project would have to be built in tunnel, on viaduct -- or on the surface. The latter idea is rejected out of hand by many Seattle businesses and residents, fearing loss of on-street parking.

Local media note that both monorail and light rail have been "approved" by voters. Yeah, right. Voters have approved local financing for regional express bus, commuter rail and light rail -- but not for monorail. Monorail may never die, but without financing, it will just fade away. The tax proposals are separate -- Sound Transit's was approved in 1996. However, light rail and monorail supporters both anticipate future competition for funds, including federal funds.

"Seattle Times" guest columnist Walt Crowley characterized monorail and light rail supporters' view of each other s pet project:

"A bureaucratic boondoggle concocted in the back room of the Rainier Club."

"A populist pipe dream scribbled in the backseat of Dick Falkenbury's taxicab."

"That pretty well sums up the high esteem in which supporters of the monorail and Sound Transit hold each other."

"Such views are now expressed mostly privately, although the current sotto voce sniping threatens to explode publicly in the coming debate over funding monorail construction." archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=crowley20&date=20021020&query=monorail. (Crowley, who was a consultant to the 1996 Sound Transit campaign and served on the ETC board in 1998, favors both light rail and monorail.

For those who find transit duels just a tad too violent, the P-I ran a "Monorail v. LRT Q&A" in mid-October seattlepi.nwsource.com/transportation/mono-lite-qa.shtml. (Remember, this is the "P-I," which has endorsed the monorail, so you might want to check anything you quote from this article!)

One of the many technical issues raised by various FOCs is the need for "drip pans," identified by Parsons Brinckerhoff engineers as a potential liability issue. A monorail occupying a public right-of-way (e.g. a street) would need some form of shield to protect people below from being hit by falling water, oil or debris.

A mid-October "Seattle Times" article featured a possible "model" for the Seattle monorail, in a city not too far away -- Vancouver, BC. No, Skytrain is not a monorail, and no, we didn't make this up: http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/134554121_vancouver13m.html.

"Like a monorail, the SkyTrain combines mountain views with the pleasure of looking down on gridlocked drivers. High-rises have grown up around the stations, boosting the clientele and reducing regional sprawl. TransLink, the local public transportation agency, says the original line now covers its own operating costs, a rarity in North America.

'The good news is that elevated transportation generally works,' says Dick Falkenbury, the cab driver who founded the populist monorail movement in Seattle."

(The only problem, Dick, is that "elevated" describes an alignment configuration, NOT the technology that operated on this alignment. Now please explain the cult-like fervor over technology?)

Meanwhile, down Tacoma way, there is considerable interest in a short extension to the new 1.6-mile streetcar line (scheduled to open in fall 2003 www.soundtransit.org/linkrail/tacoma/tacoma.htm) The Puyallup Tribe of Indians is preparing to build a new casino near downtown Tacoma. Municipal and tribal governments are cooperating on a plan to extend the south end of the line 1/4 mile east from the maintenance base, on East 25 th St, to Portland Avenue. The tribe has agreed to pay half of the estimated $25,000 cost of a feasibility study, and might consider paying part of the construction cost, depending on the study outcome. www.tribnet.com/news/government/story/1974263p-2076451c.htm.


posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 10/29/2002 04:44:00 PM

 
SEATTLE PART 10: IT'S THE WATER . . . AND WHO KNOWS WHAT ELSE

"It is the unfortunate destiny of the ridiculous to be subject to ridicule."
James Howard Kunstler

From the Cabalmaster:

SEATTLE PART 10: IT’S THE WATER . . . AND WHO KNOWS WHAT ELSE

Continuing our coverage of Seattle's monorail plan:

HONESTY
IS SUCH A LONELY WORD,
EVERYONE IS SO UNTRUE
HONESTY
IS HARDLY EVER HEARD
THE MONORAIL NEEDS IT FROM YOU

(with apologies to Billy Joel; unadulterated lyrics are at www.lyricsxp.com/lyrics/h/honesty_billy_joel.html)

We mentioned before that Seattle residents could avoid the monorail excise tax on vehicles by using a post-office box outside the city as their "address" We also mentioned that this would not be illegal ("tax avoidance" and "tax evasion" are not the same things . . .) -- and that ETC did not consider this a problem.

However, a poll, commissioned by monorail opponents, found that more than 20 percent of Seattle residents would consider doing this seattlepi.nwsource.com/transportation/92860_monorail25.shtml.

Are you finished guffawing yet?

A poll commissioned by one side or the other is naturally suspect. In addition, the legislature could always close the loophole if "monorail tax avoidance" became a significant problem. So, there's probably not much more here than entertainment value. (But we thought you'd enjoy it.)

PETITIONS? WE DON'T WANT NO MORE STINKING PETITONS!

Seattle's attack of mindless paranoia turned into a comedy farce at midsummer, inspiring the above weak attempt at humor. Some monorail supporters took seriously a threat by a "political gun-for-hire" to circulate a petition for a shorter and cheaper monorail, in order to split the pro-monorail vote seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorialsopinion/134517115_monoed20.html. This was technically possible (since the state enabling act required fewer than 4,000 valid signatures) -- but politically unlikely.

"We share their concern, and want to alert potential petition signers."

No, no, no, we did NOT make that up. It's a direct quote from a newspaper editorial . . . the "Post-Intelligencer," not "The Stranger." seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/82868_trojaned.shtml

At the end of August, King County election officials announced that monorail supporters had collected enough signatures to place the monorail plan on the November ballot. The speed with which monorail supporters mobilized their troops suggests that "Monomania" will not go away anytime soon even if voters reject the plan http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/85135_initiatives31.shtml.

Another point of contention was the composition of the ETC board. ETC's proposal for an appointed board, with the current board appointing its successors after the election, was criticized as lacking accountability. Monorail supporters argued that this arrangement would avoid the perception of "cronyism" and other sins, and insure that "everyone" would have a chance to serve, not just those interested in running for office archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=elevated22&date=20020722&query=elevated+transportation+company+board. The "current" board would decide whether its successor would be all-elected, all-appointed or "blended" following the election.

In the best tradition of the late Richard Nixon, we suspect that monofoa . . . that's "enthusiastic monorail supporters" . . . have added Washington State Transportation Secretary Doug MacDonald to their "enemies list." The WSDOT secretary has posted an online report critical of plans for monorail construction along Interstate 5 www.wsdot.wa.gov/transit/monorail/default.htm. (Supporters of this idea include University of Washington Professor Emeritus Folke Nyberg freewaymonorail.org/news.htm; see also archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=folke21&date=20021021&query=monorail) Monorail construction along I-5 would present "engineering nightmares" at the WA State Convention and Trade Center (which is built over the freeway in downtown Seattle), the Lake Washington Ship Canal (which the freeway crosses on a large two-level bridge) and at overpasses. Although MacDonald did not directly challenge the monorail ballot measure, the report presents monorail technology in a less than favorable manner, and states that monorail lines have less capacity than light rail.

(We Opinionated Ones think that such "global" generalizations are worse than meaningless. The Tokyo Monorail, for example, could not carry the same peak-period traffic almost anywhere in the U.S. as it does in Tokyo -- simply because U.S. consumers will not tolerate the crowding that Tokyo consumers do.)

Some monorail foa . . . er, activists . . . regard any opposition as stemming from a "Sound Transit conspiracy."

"On the Rise Above It All e-mail list, which fosters a discussion among a group of monorail buffs, anyone who questions any aspect of the project is instantly accused of being a liar, a spy for Sound Transit (or [Tim] Eyman), or, worst of all, an outsider. People from outside Seattle proper are not permitted to have opinions about the monorail because it is by and for Seattleites only." www.seattleweekly.com/features/0242/news-berger.shtml.

A mid-October debate featured the following exchange:

"If we build the Ballard-to-West Seattle monorail tomorrow, we'll still have the transportation problems we're facing today," [former Port Commissioner and monorail opponent Henry] Aronson said.

"Pressed by moderator C.R. Douglas to state what he would do instead of build monorail, Aronson answered, "Northgate to the airport, absolutely."

"So the cat's out of the bag!" whispered Patrick Kylen, campaign manager for Rise Above It All, as Aronson spoke."

No, no, no, we didn’t make that up, see:
seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/134556094_monodebate16m0.html.

The "cat," of course, is the nefarious Sound Transit conspiracy against the righteous monorail . . . or something like that. Or, as an FOC puts it:

". . . despite widespread and repeated proclamations of replacing LRT with monorail, stopping the Link project, etc., etc., the ETC monorail campaign is not even mentioned as a conspiracy to kill or stymie Link LRT plans ... but the opposition is pilloried as a Sound Transit conspiracy to stop the monorail."

To be fair, the "Seattle Times" reporter merely quoted someone else. But we've noticed that people who express opinions such as that immediately above are seldom quoted in the Seattle media.

And we should also mention that no fewer than four former governors have endorsed the monorail plan: Al Rosellini, Dan Evans, Booth Gardner, and Mike Lowry. They've been joined by Sierra Club Cascade Chapter, although we're advised that this particular endorsement generated lots of controversy within the organization. An FOC tells us that some Sierra Club members have withheld dues payments over the organization's perceived lack of common sense with regard to transit projects.

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 10/29/2002 04:27:00 PM

 
SEATTLE PART 9: THE CULT OF THE MONORAIL

"It is the unfortunate destiny of the ridiculous to be subject to ridicule."
James Howard Kunstler

From the Cabalmaster:

SEATTLE PART 9: THE CULT OF THE MONORAIL
(or: Where is Jonathan Richmond when we need him?)

The Historical Context

We continue our coverage of Seattle's monorail plan:

MONORAIL: FROM CURIOSITY TO CAUSE TO CULT (Continued)

Voter approval of Initiative 41 and establishment of the Elevated Transportation Company was a major victory for monorail supporters www.monorail.org/History.htm. But hopes of private-sector financing soon evaporated. We Opinionated Ones know of several suppliers and consultants who would love to build a monorail in Seattle -- with someone else's money.

The Seattle City Council balked at the idea of reallocating funds from existing programs to pay for a feasibility study, and no one took seriously the I-41 provisions mandating bond sales, a tax increase -- or a cutoff of councilmember salaries if they did not follow through. I-41 did not provide ETC with a dedicated funding source, leading to a predictable outcome: in April 2000, the council effectively repealed I-41 and abolished ETC.

Peter Sherwin, an activist and monorail supporter, then founded an organization, "Rise Above It All" to collect signatures for a second monorail initiative. This qualified for the ballot as Initiative 53 www.ci.seattle.wa.us/ethics/el00a/report/vpg/monorlct.htm. This mandated a feasibility study and allocated $6 million to finance it. I-53 attracted a 58 percent "yes" vote in November 2000, resurrecting ETC.

In response to two votes demonstrating, at least, that a majority of voters thought monorail was a good idea and wanted further study, many elected officials turned from skeptics to supporters . However, one obstacle remained: imposing a "local-option" tax increase for monorail construction would require an enabling act by the state legislature. This seemed like a tough sell. However, as part of the compromise that crafted Referendum 51 (a "transportation" financing package for the November 2002 state ballot), the legislature gave ETC authority to impose four different taxes: a motor vehicle excise tax, a motor vehicle license fee, a rental-car tax and a property tax.

MONORAIL FREUNDDAMMERUNG ("The Fall of the Monorail Supporters")

Your Favorite Transit Pundits must confess that we once admired Seattle's monorail activists, who successfully took on and shook up the city's political and transit "Establishment." Unfortunately, they've fallen victim to the classic dilemma facing American populists: success requires working with "the system" -- that is, within the overall political system. That, in turn, requires compromise, tolerance of different opinions, learning to live with defeats and partial victories, and so forth. This dilemma has a particularly wicked twist for populists -- the greater the success, the more urgent the need to work with "the system" lest their influence evaporate. But working with "the system" also tends to cause evaporation of populist appeal and influence.

As much entertainment as the Seattle monorail story has provided (we've laughed hard enough to reveal the location of Line's End, the Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal's hidden retreat), the descent of parts of the pro-monorail community into paranoia and cult-like behavior is disappointing.

For example: a monorail advocacy group, Friends of the Monorail, unsuccessfully sued Sound Transit after ST rejected monorail technology. ST took action based on an alternatives analysis, not a plot. (That's AA, not P-L-O-T.) Nonetheless, some monorail supporters saw this as yet another aspect of a huge anti-monorail conspiracy.

(This "conspiracy" must be a huge undertaking indeed. As we've mentioned before, the Japanese-language literature contains absolutely no hint that any additional monorail lines are under consideration beyond the line nearing completion in Naha, a short extension planned in Chiba, and a somewhat longer one planned for Tokyo-Tama. Imagine that -- the "conspiracy" has even managed to squelch Japan's "monorail renaissance." This phrase, as we hope we made clear with our Japanese monorail series, is a figment of some over-enthusiastic monorail booster's imagination -- and it's a safe bet that this person cannot read a single character of Japanese. The Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal may include one or more members, one who may read at least one Asian language.)

We Opinionated Ones regard conspiracy theories as the opiate of the lazy (it's easier to be paranoid than critical). We watched with amazement in August as Seattle monorail activists began another petition drive to place the financing proposal on the ballot seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/134512247_monorail13m.html:

"So much for getting along well with others. Rise Above It All (RAIA), the monorail campaign, launched an all-out assault on its (real or perceived) enemies last weekend, when campaign founder Peter Sherwin sent a letter to monorail supporters urging them to 'take to the streets' in support of the cause. The occasion for this momentous call to arms? The Seattle City Council, which at its Monday meeting delayed a vote on the monorail plan until Sept. 9, had threatened to discuss the monorail plan further and possibly even--gasp!--amend it to reflect its concerns about the proposal, potentially the biggest public-works project in Seattle history.

"That didn't sit well with monorail stalwarts like Sherwin, who rallied his troops to go out and gather signatures to force the measure onto the ballot without the input of those pesky elected representatives. 'We have reason to believe that the plan will not be put on the ballot intact,' Sherwin warned supporters in his letter.

"Sherwin says he has no specific concerns but worries that the monorail plan might get put off so long that the council won't have a chance to vote it through before Sept. 20, the deadline for putting measures on the November ballot. 'We
just want to be sure the people get a chance to vote on the monorail plan in November," Sherwin says. In his letter, Sherwin also mentions 'the motives of several members of the City Council.' " www.seattleweekly.com/features/0233/news-barnett.shtml

("Take to the streets" . . . "We have reason to believe" . . . "the motives" . . . we hope that skeptical websurfers will click the link above and verify that we Opinionated Ones are NOT making any of this up!]

Although the Seattle council and ETC reached near-total agreement on details, some points of contention remained, including the ballot title (limited by law to 75 words). seattlepi.nwsource.com/transportation/82449_monorail13.shtml. Some activists "did not trust" the council to complete work in time for submission on the November ballot. The statutory deadline was September 20, and the council postponed a final vote to September 9. Another item of contention: whether to spend $150,000 to build a full-scale monorail structure mock-up in downtown Seattle.

Nick Licata, described as one of the strongest monorail supporters on the Seattle city council, said that "endless questions" from other councilmembers could be interpreted by the public as an attempt to "undermine" the monorail. (So now you know: monomania is not confined to "citizen" foa . . . er, activists . . . )

Hence, ETC and the campaign organization launched a petiition drive. This raised the possibility of two monorail measures on the ballot. This drew the following comment from councilmember Richard Conlin: "If they (the ETC) don't want two measures on the ballot, then stop doing petitions."

But the drive continued seattlepi.nwsource.com/paynter/82468_paynter14.shtml:

"No mad dogs or Englishmen were in sight yesterday at Green Lake.But the dogged fans of an expanded, people-moving monorail were out in the near-90 degree noonday sun seeking petition signatures to get their fine madness
back on the ballot.

"Again."

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 10/29/2002 04:15:00 PM

 
SEATTLE PART 8: THE CULT OF THE MONORAIL

"It is the unfortunate destiny of the ridiculous to be subject to ridicule."
James Howard Kunstler

From the Cabalmaster:

SEATTLE PART 8: THE CULT OF THE MONORAIL
(or: Where is Jonathan Richmond when we need him?)
The Historical Context

We continue our coverage of Seattle's monorail plan:

METRO OUT, SOUND TRANSIT IN

Late in 1990, a federal court ruled that the 44-member Metro Council, a mix of elected and appointed officials, violated the "one person, one vote" principle and ordered reorganization. King County Voters eventually approved consolidation of Metro and the King County government, supervised by an expanded "Metropolitan King County" council. This took effect from the beginning of 1994.

Meanwhile, the legislature created the Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority, responsible for planning, building and operating regional transit. RTA adopted a 16-year "Phase 1" program in 1994, including a three-route, 69-mile LRT network, express bus services and commuter rail between Everett, Seattle and Tacoma. Price tags: $574 million for commuter rail, $4 billion for light rail, $6.7 billion total. A 0.4-percent sales-tax increase and a 0.3 percent Motor Vehicle Excise Tax within the RTA district would generate an estimated $200 million per year. RTA assumed $40 million per year from state and $85 million per year from federal sources, and up to $800 million in bonds.

This plan was rejected by voters on March 14, 1995, attracting a 47 percent "yes" vote. However, 51 percent of King County and 62 percent of Seattle voters approved. The plan did not fare well in suburban areas, nor with Republicans: registered Democrats voted 3 to 1 in favor; registered Republicans voted 2 to 1 against. Rejection was attributed to opposition to increased taxes, a belief that the plan was too big, and RTA's acknowledgement that the plan would do little to reduce traffic congestion.

Rail plans in Seattle have long attracted tenacious opposition. Shortly before the vote, supporters had raised $272,000 while opponents had raised $106,000 for their campaigns. The latter amount is the largest known to have been spent to oppose a rail transit ballot measure up to that time.

The state law that created RTA mandated a second vote after an unsuccessful first vote -- and dissolution of the agency following a second failure at the polls. RTA revised the plan, trimming the light rail component to a single 24-mile line between the University District, downtown Seattle and Sea-Tac Airport, with a short (1.6-mile) line between downtown Tacoma and a new transit center and commuter-rail station near the Tacoma Dome. The plan, marketed as "Sound Move," also included a regional express-bus network, and an Everett-Seattle-Tacoma-Lakewood commuter-rail service. The total price tag was $3.9 billion.

As the election date approached, and forecasts of another defeat were bandied about by various pundits, RTA issued staff layoff notices and began preparing to shut itself down. But voters had other ideas: on November 5, 1996, the plan attracted a 57 percent "yes" vote. RTA, now known as Sound Transit, began "ST Express" bus services began operation in September 1999 www.soundtransit.org/stexpress/stexpress.htm. The first stage of "Sounder" commuter rail service, between Seattle and Tacoma, opened on September 9, 1999 www.soundtransit.org/sounder/sounder.htm. The "Tacoma Link" LRT line (using Czech-built cars like the Portland Streetcar) is planned for opening in 2003 www.soundtransit.org/linkrail/tacoma/tacoma.htm. The "Central Link" LRT project hit a major snag late in 2000, when bids for the planned tunnel between downtown Seattle and the "U District" came in far over the amount budgeted www.munileague.org/muninews/2001-02/soundtransit.htm. The agency revised its cost estimates, extended the construction schedule and deferred the northward line, outlining a 14-mile starter segment between downtown Seattle and the airport. This generated a great deal of criticism and negative publicity. Rail opponents filed suit, hoping to force a second vote. At the end of September, a King County Superior Court judge announced that he would issue a ruling within 30 days seattlepi.nwsource.com/transportation/89016_suit28.shtml.

MONORAIL: FROM CURIOSITY TO CAUSE TO CULT

During the final waning days of the 1950s, Seattle business and political leaders hatched a scheme to hold the first U.S. World's Fair since 1939-1940. "Century 21," as they called it, ran from April to October 1962 and attracted 10 million visitors seattlepi.nwsource.com/specials/worldsfair/. The former World's Fair site is now Seattle Center, a popular venue for a large variety of events. www.seattlecenter.com. The most visible symbol of the Fair, and Seattle Center, is the 605-foot Space Needle www.spaceneedle.com/. Then there's the monorail, which was built to link the fairgrounds with downtown www.geocities.com/kgk515/index.html.

Alweg beat out another supplier when it offered to build the line at its own expense. The 0.9-mile line cost $3.5 million www.seattlemonorail.com/history.htm.

Monorail foa . . . er, enthusiasts (maybe we'll get it right one of these days) love to debate about the nefarious forces that blocked monorail expansion. They might consider the one spelled "e-c-o-n-o-m-i-c-s." Alweg recovered its investment, then turned a profit while the fair was open. Thereafter, it turned the line over to the Century 21 Corporation at no cost.

In other words, they knew the profits would disappear after the fair closed, and decided to get out while the getting was good.

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 10/29/2002 03:03:00 PM

 
ANOTHER SAEPT AWARD

"It is the unfortunate destiny of the ridiculous to be subject to ridicule."
James Howard Kunstler

From the Cabalmaster:

ANOTHER SAEPT AWARD

The Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal is pleased to award a lifetime membership in the Society for the Abolition of Effective Public Transport. Vreeland, 53, an Austin (TX) fire dispatcher (users3.ev1.net/~vicjudi/vicjudi),
www.austinchronicle.com/issues/vol18/issue30/pols.councilraces.html (scroll down), thus joins an illustrious group of Saps(tm), including Dennis "Ozone" Polhill and USC Professor Peter "The world would be better off without the [Los Angeles] Blue Line" Gordon.

In some quarters, Vreeland seems to have the image of an archetypal "Angry White Male" (don't take our word for it; click the second link above). Too bad, because his "Railroading America website" www.railroadingamerica.com/rrainfo.html, is, in a word, hilarious.

"RRA Information . . . A collection of web sites telling you the other side of rail and more . . . . Who is going to pay the tab for this national outrage - $500 billion and growing?"

500 BILLION? AS IN 500,000,000,000???*
WOW! WHAT DO WE HAVE TO DO TO GET A "PIECE" OF THAT "ACTION???"
(Guess we'd have to quit our day jobs and become light rail consultants.)

(* Win a complementary lifetime membership in the Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal! Just send an e-mail to transitcabal@yahoo.com and tell us how many times that sum of cash would circle the earth if laid end to end!)

"Buses are cheaper and better than rail - break out your Acrobat Reader"

Cheaper and better . . . reminds us of various US Postal Service flyers regarding mail fraud: IF SOMETHING SOUNDS TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE, IT PROBABLY IS.

"Critical of all socialist [sic] Austin City Council."

QUICK! REPORT THIS IMMINENT THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY TO . . . WELL, SOMEBODY! NONE OF THE AUSTIN CITY COUNCIL MEMBERS LIST A "SOCIALIST" PARTY AFFILIATION, SO THIS MUST BE A CLANDESTINE THING . . .

(Yeah, you're right, we really should quit while we're ahead on some of our gag lines . . .)

"Brookings Institute" . . . "Privatizing Urban Transportation" . . . sounds suspiciously like "Highway Communism."

"Naaaaaaaaaaa light rail couldn't be govt. waste?? [sic]"

Evidently not, Vic; we clicked the flying pig and searched the "Citizens Against Government Waste" website using "light rail" as a keyword. About all we found was the following, under "Quotes"

"I THINK FEW PEOPLE IN UTAH WOULD SAY THAT FUNDING FOR LIGHT RAIL IS A WASTE OF MONEY"

(Mary Jane Collinpriest, Press Secretary for Senator Robert Bennett, (R-Utah), March 15, 2001, Deseret News.)

The remarkable thing, Vic, judging from newspaper coverage -- and we're just as amazed as you'll be disgusted -- is that this is not only true, it's an understatement.

"Web site of Rails [sic] worst nightmare -- Wendell Cox" (www.publicpurpose.com)

HEY WENDELL! YOU'VE IMPRESSED AT LEAST ONE PERSON, BUT DON'T LET IT GO TO YOUR HEAD!!

The Wonderful Wizard of Fudge has pointedly declined (albeit tacitly) to respond to ANY of the criticisms we've raised about his "Demographia" sites, his "Lexus Line," and so forth. (You'd think he didn't like us, or something . . .)

"Independence Institute" . . . "Colorado" . . . "Denver's failed rail experiment and more" . . . WARNING! DO NOT CLICK THIS LINK UNLESS PROPERLY VENTILATED AGAINST OZONE BUILDUP! (Actually, we suspect a higher risk of encountering another, more fragrant substance.)

"Toll Roads" . . . "Ways of the Future" . . . "Building Roads without Resorting to Tax Dollars" . . . MORE HIGHWAY COMMUNISM! HASN'T THIS IDEA BEEN CONSIGNED TO THE ASH HEAP OF HISTORY?

When the laughter died down (and we made sure that we hadn't revealed the location of "Line's End," the highly secret hidden retreat of the Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal), we hung our heads in disappointment. The site has little, if anything, new.

"Suggest a web site to add to "RailRoadingAmerica.com" - People get railroaded for lack of knowledge - this is a huge corporate/ government/ environmentalist scam to fleece the American Taxpayer. Know the other side of rail, before you vote!"

Oh, yeah. The monorail in downtown Jacksonville is NOT a light rail system! It is a "gadgetbahn" people-mover. And yes, we agree with you that it is a boondoggle that never should have been built...

Oh, come on, Vic, enough with the tiresome rhetoric, already.

"The success of this web site depends on you, the ordinary taxpayer who is going to pay the tab. Is your city is on the drawing board for light rail. Put up you own local site (I can show you how to do it) email to "vrv@railroadingamerica.com."

"Railroading America." It sounded so promising. We hoped against hope that we'd found another site worth lambasting; another anti-transit orator worth lampooning (look at how much fun we have lampooning Wendell!). But, alas, there is no THERE there.

You let us down, Vic. You really did.

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 10/28/2002 06:06:00 PM

 
SEATTLE PART 7: THE CULT OF THE MONORAIL

"It is the unfortunate destiny of the ridiculous to be subject to ridicule."
James Howard Kunstler

From the Cabalmaster:

SEATTLE PART 7: THE CULT OF THE MONORAIL
(or: Where is Jonathan Richmond when we need him?)
The Historical Context

Continuing our coverage of the Seattle monorail plan:

WE WANT OUR MTV . . . er, WE WANT OUR LRT!!!

Seattle's long-depressed regional economy gained strength from the mid-1980s, triggering population -- and traffic -- increases. New skyscrapers dramatically altered the downtown skyline (and spurred an initiative to limit this), while new office space was built even faster in the suburbs. (The average Seattleite tends to ignore the obvious connection.) Between 1985 and 1990, King County gained 125,000 new residents. They brought 50,000 additional autos and made 500,000 additional daily trips on area roads by 1990. (Projections of this type of growth, and impacts thereof, were not taken seriously during the '70s.) Even with the large increase in transit ridership, extensive ridesharing and 36 miles of freeway HOV lanes, most commuters drove alone to work. Planners forecast that, from 1990 to 2000, one additional car would be added for every four on the road -- half a million more cars competing for the same space.

Population growth and traffic congestion became major public concerns by the mid-'80s. Local media provided favorable coverage of new rail lines in Portland and Vancouver, BC. One interesting comparison: BC Transit carried 105.6 million revenue passengers in the "Lower Mainland" (greater Vancouver) during FY 1988. Metro carried 65 million, nearly 40 percent less, despite serving a larger area with a greater population -- and charging a much lower fare.

PSCOG came under increasing criticism as newspaper editorials and a growing chorus of politicians argued that the region could not afford to wait until 1993 to begin rail planning. Metro also came under criticism after announcing that it would defer installation of rails in the tunnel owing to lack of funds.

The compromise between rail supporters and critics collapsed in 1988. Metro decided to proceed with rail installation (but used a spray-on insulation that was later proved inadequate, so the rails will have to be removed and replaced before any rail vehicles can use the tunnel). Pro-rail members of the King County Council then placed a non-binding referendum onto the ballot, asking if rail planning should be accelerated so service could begin before 2000 (They didn't make it . . .). This measure attracted a 69 percent "yes" vote in November 1988; rail supporters then called for submission of a specific plan, with financing, within two years. (They didn't make this one . . .)

PSCOG dug in its heels briefly, then announced at mid-1988 that it would begin detailed rail planning in 1989. Shortly before the November 1988 election, the Metro Council adopted a resolution calling for rail construction by 1995 (they didn't make this one, either . . .). Metro won the "contest" for control of regional transit development: PSCOG, which had no dedicated funding source, completed work on a regional plan ("VISION 2020" . . . those were the Bush Sr. years . . . you know, the "vision thing" . . .), then voted itself out of existence. It was reconstituted as the Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC) www.psrc.org/.

"HOW YOU GONNA GET RESPECT? YOU AIN'T CUT THE PROCESS YET!*
(*with apologies to Hank Ballard and James Brown www.onlinetalent.com/Ballard_biography.html)

In Seattle, process is at least as important as the result . . . and then some. Hence the attention to details of the rail-planning process started in 1989. Funny thing, though: impeccable process, unworkable result.

The "VISION 2020" regional plan (the "vision thing") outlined 15 regional and sub-regional centers, connected by a "High-Capacity Transit" (HCT) network. HCT corridor selection, planning and design was carried out by Metro's "Metro 2000" project (later rechristened the "Regional Transit Project"). The Legislature established two panels to supervise and coordinate HCT planning: the "Expert Review Panel" (ERP, not to be confused with ELO www.elomusic.com/. . . sorry . . .) monitored Metro and its consultant, a joint venture between Parsons Brinckerhoff (aka "those guys," aka "the taxi drivers" . . . their "meter" never stops running . . . ) and Kaiser Engineers. The Joint Regional Policy Committee (JRPC), including local and state officials, was created to coordinate HCT development in King, Pierce and Snohomish counties. Any transit plan or financing measure submitted anywhere in the three-county region had to be approved by JRPC. Metro took particular care to produce realistic cost and ridership estimates (this was during the immediate "post Pickrell Report" era). Ridership projections were based on current population patterns, with no assumption of higher density around stations. Nor did forecasts consider the effects of the state's commuter trip reduction act, which requires major employers to implement measures to discourage workers from driving alone (darn SOVs!).

YOU BUGGAHS CRAZY, O WAT?

Yeah, we know, we've used that one before, but it bears repeating. (Besides, it has more pizzazz than another cheap shot: "RTP was DOA!")

Impeccable process, unworkable result. The RTP outlined a 164-mile regional "light rail" network . . . which included extensive tunneling within Seattle and full grade separation to permit BART-type speed. The plan also included bus expansion, 400 miles of new HOV lanes and a 40-mile Seattle-Tacoma commuter-rail service. Cost, including all capital and operating expenses over 30 years, was estimated at $6.5 billion in 1991 but soared to $11.6 billion by mid-1992. The "light rail" system was estimated to cost $8 billion, with federal funds expected to pay no more than 20 percent. The remainder would be paid by a 0.9-percent sales-tax increase, or a "menu" of local tax increases to generate the equivalent revenue.

The federal Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act ("ISTEA") included $300 million for regional rail or busways in Seattle. This money had been allocated to Houston, but cancellation of a controversial monorail plan -- no, we're not making that up -- left the money up for grabs. The local congressional delegation, quite naturally, grabbed . . . and secured this amount and $25 million more for the commuter-rail project.

The $12 billion price tag created much sticker shock, virtually all of it behind the scenes. The absence of any public criticism by elected officials was deafening -- but, after all, this is Seattle, famed for being "aggressively nice." Metro, sent back to the drawing board, released a 56-mile plan in April 1992, estimated to cost $8 billion over 30 years, with about half this amount for rail construction. "Scaling down" consisted of truncating the network rather than adopting of less-costly standards. Again, the behind-the-scenes reaction was negative.

Metro could not maintain its early momentum. It anticipated a vote in September or November 1992; early in 1991, Metro even talked of holding the vote ahead of schedule, prior to completion of planning (holy blank check!). Not long thereafter, staff members realized that planning could not be completed in time for a 1992 vote. As time passed, the RTP attracted growing community opposition on grounds of cost and disruption due to tunneling. JRPC endorsed the plan but it stalled before reaching the ballot.

The RTP, prepared at a cost of $30 million, was sunk by an insistence on full grade separation, never mind the cost. Some FOCs blame this on "those guys" (the taxi meter types), but we think that's too simple. Planners complained that they did what they were told -- design a high-quality transit network to link the regional centers outlined in the regional plan ("VISION 2020") -- only to have the results rejected as unrealistic. That's also a bit too simple.

Local residents are loath to admit that Seattle has a long-standing inferiority complex vis-a-vis other regions, California in particular. This stems in large part from one inescapable fact: Seattle has neither the population base, nor the broad-based economy, to support civic amenities that San Francisco and (augh!) Los Angeles can easily afford. The Bay Area has a considerably more people than all of Washington State. With regard to transit, Seattle became America's Curitiba: emphasizing buses because it could not afford rail (after losing federal funding). Honolulu is in a similar position, but that's another story.

Low-cost light rail, as in San Diego, Sacramento or Portland, is an automatic non-starter in Seattle. The average Seattleite was firmly convinced that the Portland approach just wouldn't do (whether or not s/he had ever ridden MAX, as a surprising number of local residents had not). No, Seattle needs something "more," something "faster." Something like BART, but they don't say that. (Or something that nobody else has . . . like monorail . . .).

Low-cost surface LRT would have presented many design challenges, but these could have been overcome. However, the idea of reserved lanes, traffic signal preemption and so forth generated animosity from road interests, criticism from neighborhood groups concerned over loss of curbside parking spaces, and scorn from auto commuters.

Seattle's near-total lack of support for surface LRT as in Portland, Sacramento (or Zurich, for that matter) was demonstrated by the Puget Sound Light Rail Transit Society, founded by the late Kim Silver. Silver proposed a surface LRT line along major arterial streets between Everett, Seattle and Tacoma. This he dubbed the "Rhododendron Line," and lobbied tirelessly to generate support (fatigue and disappointment probably contributed to his death at a relatively young age). "Those guys" produced a "slash and burn" evaluation of the "Rhododendron Line" plan for Metro, but that was beside the point: the Rhododendron Line failed to attract any significant popular support (it wasn't a monorail, so it wasn't exotic enough . . .).

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 10/28/2002 12:22:00 PM

 
SEATTLE PART 6: THE CULT OF THE MONORAIL

"It is the unfortunate destiny of the ridiculous to be subject to ridicule."
James Howard Kunstler

From the Cabalmaster:

SEATTLE PART 6: THE CULT OF THE MONORAIL
(or: Where is Jonathan Richmond when we need him?)

The Historical Context

Continuing with our coverage of the Seattle monorail plan:

THE RAIL FUNDS THAT GOT AWAY

Seattle politicians, dissatisfied with the highway-oriented PSRTS, started a parallel planning effort during the early 1960s, financed by the Puget Sound Council of Governments (PSCOG), the regional planning agency. A 1964 report by DeLeuw, Cather & Co., recommended that the new Interstate 90 floating bridge across Lake Washington be designed for a future rail line. In 1965, DeLeuw, Cather recommended a 20-mile rail line, extending from downtown north to Ballard by 1975 and east across the lake to Bellevue by 1985.

Late in 1965, James Ellis called for a comprehensive civic-improvement program, which he dubbed "Forward Thrust." Planning was dominated by a coalition of business and political leaders, and assumed a larger population increase than PSRTS -- 3.1 million by 1990 (the 2000 population was 3.3 million). The revised rail plan included 47 miles of lines within King County, three miles of line serving West Seattle developed initially as a busway, and 24 miles of alignments reserved for future expansion. Capital cost was estimated at $1.117 billion over 17 years. Washington's influential Senators, the late Henry M. Jackson and Warren G. Magnuson, secured a federal commitment to pay most of this amount. A $385 million bond issue -- nearly half of the Forward Thrust program -- would pay the local share. Fares were projected to cover operating costs by 1990.

The twelve Forward Thrust proposals attracted a record-breaking 48 percent turnout at the February 1968 special election. Seven of the programs won approval, but the 50.3 percent "yes" vote for the heavy-rail plan did not meet the 60-percent threshold set by state law.

The post-mortem by campaign leaders included: failure to communicate benefits to low-income voters, competition from highway proposals seen by many voters as a less-costly alternative, and a September 1967 poll which found 64 percent in favor, lulling Forward Thrust leaders into complacency.

Forward Thrust revised the plan to include 49 miles of heavy rail and expansion of the local bus system. The cost rose to $1.321 billion, due primarily to inflation, and the bond issue was increased to $440 million. Meanwhile, The Boeing Co, the area's largest employer, laid off 62,000 workers in 1968 and 1969. The "Boeing recession" set in with full force by the date of the second special election, in May 1970, and the rail plan attracted only a 46 percent "yes" vote. Forward Thrust dissolved itself and the federal funding commitment passed to Atlanta.

Seattleites love to moan that Atlanta built its rail system with "our" money. We Opinionated Ones do not concur. An administrative funding commitment is not the same thing as cash in hand. Furthermore, Seattle would have faced tough competition from Atlanta (and from Los Angeles, had L.A. approved its 1968 rapid transit plan). A sales tax (approved in Atlanta, proposed in L.A.) provides a stronger local-funding base than a bond issue, for the latter tends to be eroded by inflation.

REVOLYUTSII! TROLLEY BUS, DA!, DIESEL BUS, NYET!

A long-simmering controversy over local transit boiled over during the early '60s. Seattle's 125-mile trolleybus system, worked by more than 300 vehicles, was installed to replace streetcars in 1940-1941. The Seattle Transit Commission, which managed the Seattle Transit System, announced plans to dieselize in December 1959. First-stage conversions, postponed until after the 1962 World's Fair, were carried out from mid-1963, slashing the network to less than 50 miles and 125 active vehicles. A tenacious, well-organized opposition sought to compel re-electrification. Seattle voters rejected a March 1964 initiative to reverse the conversions, but trolleybus supporters gained ground thereafter.

STS, which managed to pay off its RFC loan by 1952, began incurring deficits in 1963. This forced the city council to appropriate subsidies. In August 1969, the council imposed a monthly household tax to support transit. The "bus tax" drew strong opposition -- and a petition drive. Voters repealed the tax on November 4, 1969. STS hiked fares the next days, but was forced to back down by heavy political pressure. However, STS two of the remaining trolleybus lines in 1970. Trolleybus supporters, having seen the network sliced to 35 route-miles and 50 vehicles, then went after the transit management. An initiative to abolish the Transit Commission won approval in November 1970, and a new municipal Department of Transportation took over in July 1971.

Victory was sweet but hollow: the problem of how to finance transit operations had not been solved. Continued deficits forced the Seattle council to re-impose the "bus tax" less than a year after voters abolished it. By 1970, the private-sector suburban operators were fast approaching a terminal fiscal crisis. PSCOG commissioned a short- and medium-term plan for an all-bus system, operated by Metro and financed by an 0.3-percent sales-tax increase. This would be matched by state Motor Vehicle Excise Tax funds, replacing the Seattle "bus tax." State and federal gas-tax funds would pay for highway-related facilities (e.g. HOV lanes shared by buses), and federal funds would pay for buses and other capital expenses. This plan drew a 54-percent "yes" vote in King County in September 1972, and Metro took over all transit service within the county from January 1, 1973. Trolleybus supporters placed an initiative on the Seattle ballot to transfer the Seattle system to Seattle City Light, the municipal electric power utility, and require operation of a predominantly electric-powered system. Seattle voters rejected this in September 1972, but Metro -- well aware of the trolleybus initiative -- promised to retain and rebuild the existing network. This was carried out, with all-new vehicles and infrastructure, between early 1978 and mid-1981.

Metro lowered fares, improved service, built park-and-ride lots, and developed express services to major employment destinations. Ridership soared from 32 million in 1973 to 66 million in 1980, and King County voters eventually approved an additional 0.3-percent sales-tax increase for transit. We note that Metro had (and has) an abysmal cost-recovery ratio, less than 30 percent, and also has high unit operating costs (owing in part to extensive use of articulated buses).

RAILS . . . WE DON'T NEED NO STINKING RAILS!

Following rejection of the 1968 and 1970 plan, "rail transit" became the "r word" in Seattle; something to be avoided if at all possible. Politicians and planners managed remarkably well for more than a decade, until the economic stagnation of the '70s and early '80s gave way to a period of rapid growth.

A major highway project, the Interstate 90 floating bridge across Lake Washington, was halted by federal court injunction in 1971. The project appeared dead for several years thereafter: the court rejected the state's environmental-impact study, then banned land acquisition. But local officials rejected "trade-in" of $500 million in federal Interstate funds for alternate projects, and agreed on a scaled-down freeway in 1976. The project survived court challenges in 1979, Carter Administration funding cuts in 1980, and was completed in 1989 with transit and carpool lanes designed for rail conversion.

Metro took up a late 1970s proposal for a downtown bus tunnel after completing trolleybus network reconstruction. Seattle officials objected to underground operation of diesels, hence the plan for "dual-mode" operation. The tunnel plan was selected over a surface transit mall in 1983. Construction was approved by the Metro Council without a public vote; suburban council members pushed the plan through. Construction began in 1986 and the 1.3-mile tunnel opened on September 14, 1990. Cost: $470 million, with 50 percent paid by federal funds and the rest financed by Metro with available state and local funds. The 236 Italian-built dual-mode articulated buses cost an additional $90 million.

The "1980 plan" current at the time of the 1972 vote that put Metro into the transit business contained no long-range elements. Efforts to develop these created controversy in the political class. By 1985, PSCOG concluded that only rail could provide sufficient transit capacity to downtown Seattle by 2020, and recommended inclusion of a three-route- 67-mile trunk network into the Regional Transportation Plan. Some suburban politicians, together with road interests and a remarkable assortment of anti-rail agitators raised objections. So, PSCOG did the proper political thing: it deferred further study and a decision to proceed until "after 1993," when the bus tunnel and the I-90 bridge would be completed.

posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 10/28/2002 12:14:00 PM