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The Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal

Informed but opinionated commentary and analysis on urban transportation topics from the Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal. Names have been omitted to protect the guilty.

Our Mission: Monkeywrench the Anti-Transit Forces

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Monday, September 30, 2002

 
Japanese Monorail Dreams and Schemes (Monorail 20)

From the Cabalmaster:

Other plans from the formative years of monorail technology in Japan included short excursion lines at Arashiyama (west of Kyoto), Atami (southwest of Tokyo), Hiroshima, and Shingu (on the Kii Peninsula between Nagoya and Osaka).

A few short lines were planned in the Tokyo region. One of these was to connect the Tokyo Monorail terminal at Hamamatsu-cho with Tokyo Tower. Another was planned in Narita, to connect Narita station with the Shinshoji Temple (Shingon Buddhist) -- a market once served by a small streetcar line.

Long-distance monorail plans were also floated. The Nagoya Railroad considered a 20-mile line extending southwest from Gifu to Yoro, with a 7-mile branch from Usa to Hashima. An estimate, probably dating to the early 1960s, for the cost of 12-miles of double-beam line: $22.5 million, or nearly $2 million per mile ($130 million, or $11 million per mile, in today's dollars). This proposal evidently envisioned construction along the Nagara River, and seems the classic "solution in search of a problem." One of the planned markets was Gifu to Gifu-Hashima shinkansen station. The Tokaido Shinkansen bypassed Gifu some distance to the west. For political reasons, a station named Gifu-Hashima was built within Gifu Prefecture. But Gifu is just 19 miles from Nagoya, which has many more shinkansen services than Gifu-Hashima does. Hence, Gifu passengers preferred Nagoya -- which the Nagoya Railway certainly didn't mind given its overwhelming dominance between Gifu and Nagoya. The area around Gifu-Hashima shinkansen developed very slowly, and not until 1982 did the Nagoya Railway see fit to build a 0.9-mile spur from an existing line to Gifu-Hashima.

Another Nagoya Railroad monorail idea was to build 13 miles between Yagoto, in southeastern Nagoya, eastward to Toyota city, an automaking center. The problem was long-standing: lack of a rail line extending due eastward from Nagoya. Monorail was not the solution eventually chosen. A conventional rail line was built as a joint project by the Nagoya Railroad and Nagoya municipal authorities. The subway Tsurumai Line extends from central Nagoya to the city limit at Akaike; from here, the Nagoya Railroad Toyota New Line extends to Toyota city. The project was completed in 1979. Later, the subway was extended northward to a connection with the Nagoya Railroad Inuyama Line, provided a much-needed alternate route through central Nagoya.

The Nippon Airways Development firm proposed two Safege monorail lines extending from Otemachi, near Tokyo station: one 14 miles west to Mitaka, the other 31 miles east to Chiba and Goi. These were apparently proposed for construction along toll expressways.

Monorail proposals were floated for a number of cities, including Fukuoka, Gifu, Hiroshima, Kitakyushu, Kobe, Kyoto, Nagoya, Sendai, Shizuoka, Tomakomai (Hokkaido) and Tokyo. A proposed circular monorail for Tokyo was to parallel much of the Yamanote Line, for much of the distance along Meiji-dori, a peripheral road once served by Tokyo's longest trolleybus services. Fukuoka, Kobe, Kyoto and Sendai built subways, Nagoya and Tokyo continued subway expansion, and Kitakyushu eventually built the first "urban" monorail in Japan. This was not the start of a Japanese monorail "revival," as some monorail buffs claim, but the first application of monorail after the initial period of development and refinement.




Thursday, September 26, 2002

 
Monorail Facts and Figures - 19 KAMAKURA - SHONAN MONORAIL

From the Cabalmaster:

(See: www.shonan-monorail.co.jp.)

Safege suspended system, Ofuna to Shonan-Enoshima, 4.1 mi.
Through fare: $2.50.
21 cars, 7 three-car trains.
Maximum train length: three cars.

Scheduled running time between terminals :14 minutes
Schedule speed: 17.9 mph.
Maximum permitted speed is 46.5 mph.

Service:
5:30 am to 11:30 pm.
Every 7.5 min throughout most of the day.

Weekdays: 133 "down" (Enoshima) trains; 133 "up" (Ofuna) trains.

Sundays/holidays: 113 "down and 113 "up" trains.

Major stockholders include:

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.: 55.2 percent interest.
Mitsubishi Electric Corp., Ltd.: 18.4 percent.
Mitsubishi, Ltd.: 18.4 percent.
Nippon Steel Corp., Ltd. (world's largest steelmaker): 2.5 percent.
Keihin Electric Express Railway Co., Ltd.: 1.3 percent.
Nippon Kokan, Ltd. (Japan's second-largest steelmaker): 1.3 percent.

Did somebody say, "Supplier Financing"?

Mitsubishi, licensee for Safege technology, wanted a larger-scale showcase than the tiny, unsuccessful Nagoya line. It organized the Shonan Monorail Co, Ltd, and secured permission to build between Ofuna, southwest of Yokohama, and the seaside resort town of Enoshima. Although Enoshima already had a rail connection to Tokyo and a local electric railway, the monorail would operate through an area with considerable development but no fixed-guideway transport. ("Shonan" is a regional name.)

"Interurban" monorail lines had been proposed in Japan since the 1920s, but this line has the character of a suburban connector. It was built over the area's major transport corridor, a two-lane road built by the Keihin Electric Express Railway ("Keikyu") but open for public use. (Privately-financed roads, toll and free, are not uncommon in Japan.)

The Shonan Monorail extends 4.1 miles between terminals. Since it was built along a local road, it has relatively sharp curves and grades to 7.4 percent. The line also has two short tunnels, required by local geography. It is single-"track," with passing sidings at four of the six intermediate stations. Both terminals have two tracks. Trains operate with two-man crews, and the intermediate stations are unattended. Traction current is 1500V dc.

In 1999, the line averaged 15,000 passengers per day. The company reported $14.6 million in revenue and $12.4 million in expenses, leaving a $2.2 million operating surplus, representing 15 percent of revenue. We opinionated TransitCabalists regard this line as a self-supporting technology showcase that also serves a useful transport function (very useful during the summer beach-going season).

The Shonan Monorail provides an interesting ride and demonstrates, among other things, that there is such a thing as a practical monorail "switch" (as opposed to "turnout"). On the other hand, there is no prospect for extension, not even 0.6 mile farther south to Enoshima Island. This link was planned as a monorail line as long ago as 1927 and again during the early 1960s.




Friday, September 20, 2002

 
Next Posting Thursday, September 26, 2002

From the Cabalmaster:

The Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal will be off to Vegas for the American Public Transit Association (APTA) conference and transit trade show, effective this evening.

Next posts will be on Thursday, September 26, 2002.

Thank you for reading our website.


Tuesday, September 17, 2002

 
Japanese Monorail Facts and Figures - 18

From the Cabalmaster:

We're opinionated, but we're also pro-transit, and so we Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal members do not celebrate the failure of public transit ventures such as the two short Japanese monorails below. However, we are also truth-tellers. And so, unlike certain monorail buffs, we do not shy away from presenting the "down side" of the Japanese monorail story.

Himeji - City of Himeji:

Himeji is a regional center about 35 miles west of Kobe, is best known for its magnificent castle, built from 1581 and considered the finest in Japan. This stands about a mile north of Himeji station. Another attraction stands southeast of the station: Tegarayama hill, which has a monument to the victims of the 1945 firebomb attacks against Japanese cities, a library, a concert hall and other cultural facilities.

Plans for a regional exposition stimulated interest in a monorail link between Himeji station and Tegarayama. This idea attracted strong support from the city's Mayor. The city received authority to build from the Transport Ministry in 1964 and began construction in 1965.

A one-mile, single-beam Nihon-Lockheed line was built at a cost of about $5 million, and opened in 1966. This had four cars, which could be coupled into trains of the desired length. Technical features included automatic train stop (ATS). Traction current was 600V dc. Two-car trains were standard, but three-car trains were operated during the exhibition. Service was provided every 15 minutes at first. The maximum permitted speed was 31 mph, and the line provided a schedule speed of 15 mph.

The Himeji Monorail carried an average of 1,000 passengers per day during its first year of operation, about one-third of the anticipated traffic. By 1968, when service was reduced to a 20-minute headway, traffic had fallen to 700 per day. Operating losses (and interest payments on the money borrowed to build the line) mounted, and by 1970 a new Mayor was seeking to close the line. Proposals for extensions north to Himeji Castle and south to the city's passenger ship terminal attracted some support, but the city eventually decided not to throw good money after bad. Operation was suspended in 1974, and closure was made permanent from 1979. The city announced a few years ago that the monorail beam would be dismantled, but this has not been carried out.


Sunday, September 15, 2002

 
Response to Criticism of Denver Transit Alliance LRT Report

From the Cabalmaster:

One persistent critic of both transit in general and the Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal apparently thinks he's scored a major coup in finding alleged errors in the Denver Transit Alliance Report "LRT Ridership and Cost in 7 Western Cities." He posted his "findings" on the Usenet groups alt.planning.urban and misc.transport.urban-transit.

Well, this person--let's call him R.C.--was correct that Table 1 in the report had a typo, labeling the table as "Six Cities" when the correct number was seven! Got us there, R.C.!

He also alleged that there were "arithmetic errors" in the two key tables in the report. But Cabalmaster was unable to find any, other than the total capital cost for the Portland Westside LRT was not included in the Table 2 total--as it should not have been since apparently there was not reliable number for "original" cost estimate. Well, I suppose R.C. got the report author again--there probably should have been a footnote to the effect that the Portland Westside LRT amount was left out of the total, even though just looking at the table made that clear.

Then there was R.C.'s confusion about the definition of "riders" and "boardings" and whether the source of the data was APTA or the FTA. Well, R.C., anyone who has studied transit for any length of time knows that the "standard" definition of a rider is a "boarding" per the NTD definitions (you'll have to figure out what "NTD" is yourself, R.C.!) For all practical purposes, the terms "rider," "passenger," and "boarding" are fully interchangeable and all mean exactly the same thing, counted each time one person "boards" one transit vehicle, whether an LRT car, a bus, a subway car, whatever. APTA and FTA agree on this! Also, "daily" patronage is the same as "weekday patronage," which you would have noticed if you actually had any reading comprehension, R.C.

Of course, R.C.'s quibbles actually didn't include any real questioning whether the reported patronage and capital cost numbers were correct. Since the information was obtained from primary sources (e.g., the transit agencies), THAT data certainly was going to be reliable--having to meet FTA NTD requirements for reporting transit capital spending, for one thing.

One more thing. The FTA's "mandatory" ridership reporting is central to NTD reporting requirements, a requirement made of every recipient of Federal Transit funds. We in the Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal are not aware of any "mandatory" ridership reporting requirement from new transit systems constructed under the FTA AA process, other than the universal NTD reporting requirements.

BTW, R.C. is the same fellow who took a big, noisy, but utterly pointless tangent when the Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal pointed out the conversion between hectares and square miles--something the average American probably would not know off the top of their heads--turning it into an absurd argument about the metric system being "official" since the time of President Jefferson (an effort to make it official in Congress when Jefferson was President--but lost by one vote--is NOT official, R.C.!) The most accurate statement today about this is that the metric system in the U.S. is now "semi-official."

While the military and many industries have converted to metric (many for global competitiveness reasons), many other industries have not "officially" converted. Witness the weight information on the cereal box of Post Grapenuts Cabalmaster had this morning: Net Wt 24 Oz (1 Lb 8 Oz) (680g). If Post had gone "metric" why not 600g or 750g? As opposed to 1.5 pounds??



Wednesday, September 11, 2002

 
At Last! A Report with Real World FACTs Regarding Success of Light Rail

From the Cabalmaster:

We in the Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal wish we had referenced this report earlier.

See www.transitalliance.org/LRTRidershipAndCostIn7WesternCities/LRTRidershipAndCostIn7WesternCities.htm for an excellent report on the actual success of new light rail transit lines in the United States. This report, by the Transit Alliance of Denver, is an excellent antidote to the snake oil put out by Wendell Cox and similar anti-transit troubadours.


Tuesday, September 10, 2002

 
"YOU BUGGAHS CRAZY, O WAT?" (Seattle Mega-Freeway Plan)

From the Cabalmaster:

The above variation on a Shakespearian theme (Twelfth Night, “My masters, are you mad?”) by James Grant Benton, the late Hawaiian comedian, comes to mind as we peruse recent news from Seattle.

(And no, we’re not referring to the City of Seattle’s monorail plan!)

State and local transportation officials are assembling a “wish list” of highway “mega-projects.” These include replacement of the four-lane Evergreen Point Floating Bridge across Lake Washington with a six-lane structure, designed for future “expandability” to accommodate light rail or (naturally) monorail. The two additional lanes would be for buses and high-occupancy vehicles. Local officials from “Eastside” suburban communities favored an eight-lane bridge. (See: “Plan to widen 520 bridge wins key backing,” Seattle P-I, Friday, September 6, 2002; seattlepi.nwsource.com/transportation/85884_bridge06.shtml)

We think that this plan, and five similar schemes in the Seattle area (see: www.wsdot.wa.gov/projects/cevp/default.htm) are divorced from reality -- of the financial variety. Total cost in today’s dollars is about $25 billion, to be spent over the next 10-15 years.

You won’t win any friends in Washington State for saying this, but $25 million is a lot of money for a state with just six million people (projected to increase to 7.5 million by 2020). This proposed highway outlay makes the estimated cost of an LRT subway between downtown Seattle and the University of Washington look like the "bargain of the century" in comparison.

The Seattle metropolitan region has three million people today (projected to grow to 3.8 million by 2020). In other words, the highway mega-projects would cost something like $400-500 per person per year-–not including interest. Current funding sources would provide nowhere near this amount. And state transportation officials admit that tolls would raise a “disappointingly small” share of the cost.

Substantial tax increases and bond issues will be necessary to pay for the “megaprojects.” We wouldn’t be surprised if state and local voters replied, “You buggahs crazy, o wat?”


Monday, September 09, 2002

 
Transitcabal Anthem, Verses 4 and 5

From the Cabalmaster:

(Go to www.japan-railways.com/musice.htm, and under “Shinkansen,” play the first selection, and sing loud!)

TRANSITCABALISTS,
JUST GET THE FACTS,
SMALL STUFF COX FLUBS,
WHY TRUST HIS ACT?

TRANSITCABALISTS,
WE SEE "BIG" PICTURE,
COX RARELY IF EVER,
CABALISTS A BIG ITCH HERE!

(E-mail your suggestions to transitcabal@yahoo.com, but keep them “clean,” please!)




 
Dr. Peter Gordon, Notorious Anti-Rail Academic, Gets Black Eye from USC Administration

From the Cabalmaster:

Dr. Peter Gordon, PhD, a Professor of Economics at the University of Southern California, is apparently ignored by his own university administration. This is interesting because Dr. Gordon, the first recipient of the Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal's "SAEP" ("sap") award, is one of the few anti-rail troubadours who actually has ever published in peer-reviewed publications, and is one of the biggest anti-rail hotheads as well.

Published Monday, September 9, 2002, in the Los Angeles Times.

Clearing the Road for Pet Projects

* Politics: Ballot initiative would divert 30% of auto sales taxes to causes that include a golf cart path.

By Jon Ortiz

SACRAMENTO -- Casino operators, land developers, museum boosters and a major private university, among others, have poured millions into a November ballot initiative that would funnel tax dollars into their favorite projects in the name of easing freeway congestion.

Proposition 51 would take car sales taxes that normally help pay for prisons, parks, health care and other government services and use them to finance dozens of projects, including a rail line with stops at an Indian casino, golf cart paths for a gated retirement community, fuel-efficient boats for Lake Tahoe and a railroad museum addition.

The proposition, titled the Traffic Congestion Relief and Safe School Buses Act, guarantees 30% of state motor vehicle sales taxes would be set aside for road and transit projects and a smattering of land conservation grants....

Projects that found their way into the initiative include:

several listing deleted...

* A $75-million project to provide rail service to USC. The university's $300,000 is the largest single contribution to date. USC President Steven B. Sample decided to donate the money after the Planning and Conservation League amended the proposition to guarantee that the transit line would go underground as it entered Exposition Park, a university spokeswoman said.

For the rest of article, see www.latimes.com

This light rail route, the "Exposition Line" if built, would be an extension of the LRT route that Dr. Gordon loves to hate, the downtown Los Angeles-Long Beach "Blue Line."

Now, we in the Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal question the way the PCL initiative was put together; that is, basically as a political pork barrel where political contributions determine what projects get funded, regardless of actual transportation merit. On the other hand, that doesn't mean that some of the projects, such as the proposed Exposition LRT line, aren't justified. Even Gordon would have to admit that this Blue Line extension has better traffic potential than most new LRT proposals around the country, given the large population it would serve plus the very high population density in the downtown LA-USC-Culver City corridor (often higher than the "Wilshire Corridor.")

We just have to laugh and snicker out loud, and all through the day, when we contemplate that apparently Dr. Gordon was ignored almost completely by his own university administration.




Friday, September 06, 2002

 
MONORAIL FACTS AND FIGURES - 17

From the Cabalmaster:

KAWASAKI - ODAKYU ELECTRIC RAILWAY CO, LTD, MONORAIL LINE:

This short (0.7-mile) line connected Mukogaoka-yuen station on the Odakyu (pronounced something like "oh-DA-cue;" the stress on the middle syllable is slight but audible) main line with one of the company's many subsidiaries, the Mukogaoka amusement park. It was closed in 2001 after Odakyu decided that required major repairs could not be justified.

In 1962, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd, (Kobe) licensed the rail-on-beam supported monorail system developed by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. A subsidiary, Nihon-Lockheed Monorail Co, Ltd, built a half-mile test line at the Kawasaki Aircraft Co plant near Gifu.

Odakyu opened its high-speed electric railway between Tokyo (Shinjuku station) and Odawara, 51 miles, in 1927. The amusement park, and a miniature railway linking it to the nearby Odakyu station, also opened in 1927. The amusement park was located northwest of central Kawasaki, in an area that was then well beyond Tokyo's suburban fringe. Development encroached following World War II. Plans by Kanagawa Prefecture for a bypass road on the same alignment led to replacement of the miniature railway by Nihon-Lockheed's first commercial monorail installation.

The monorail opened in 1966. It had a single two-car train, which operated between 9 a.m. and 6:30 p.m. Monday - Thursday on Saturday. Service began at 12:30 p.m. on Friday and at 9:30 a.m. on Sunday, owing to different opening hours at the amusement park. The line provided service every 15 minutes, and the trip required just three minutes, providing a schedule speed of 14 mph.

Although equipped with resilient wheels, the train sounded much like conventional rail vehicles when negotiating curves. It carried an average of 2,000 passengers during the 1980s, but traffic fell to 1,300 per day by the end of the '90s.

A scheduled inspection in February 2000 discovered cracks in the running gear frame of one car. Operation was temporarily suspended while the company consulted the supplier. The running gear frames were judged to be life-expired. The company decided that the estimated $3 million cost could not be justified. Formal closure became permanent in December 2001.


Thursday, September 05, 2002

 
TransitCabal Anthem, Verses 1, 2 and 3

From the Cabalmaster:

(Go to www.japan-railways.com/musice.htm, and under “Shinkansen,” play the first selection, and sing loud!)

TRANSITCABALISTS,
SING ONE AND ALL,
ALL THOSE OPPONENTS,
THEY SHALL SURELY FALL!

TRANSITCABALISTS,
CHECK OUT OUR SITE,
MIRED IN FUDGE?
WE’LL TRY TO SET IT RIGHT!

TRANSITCABALISTS,
WE’RE EVERYWHERE!
EVEN INCLUDING
WENDELL COX’S HAIR!

(E-mail your suggestions to transitcabal@yahoo.com, but keep them “clean,” please!)



 
HE'S NOT MEDIOCRE -- HE'S JUST AVERAGE - III

From the Cabalmaster:

Much of the data and statistics on “The Public Purpose” and “Demographia” remind we Opinionated Ones of a 1972 hit single by “War” (see: www.lyricsxp.com/lyrics/t/the_world_is_a_ghetto_war.html). However, the “song” presented by Wendell and company holds that the world is a suburb (rather than a “ghetto”).

We presume that Wendell wants you to believe that this reflects "choice." We're not convinced.

“The Public Purpose” and “Demographia” fail consistently to present anything resembling context together with their population-change statistics. For us, this would include -- “before” and “after:”

---average household size.

---average age of residents.

---share of population aged 18 and under (that is, children).

---number of housing units.

---per-capita income.

---inflation-adjusted price of housing.

We TransitCabalists can think of at least one city where:

---the share of population under 18 is about the lowest in the country.

---the number of housing units has increased very slowly; significant expansion has been fought tenaciously by neighborhood groups.

--demand, in the form of the large number of high-income people who want to live there, exacerbated by the restrictions on supply, has pushed housing prices to stratospheric levels.

(That’s the city named for that gentle saint from Assisi.)

We can also think of another city where:

---the number of housing units has increased significantly, owing to large-scale replacement of single-family dwellings by apartments and condos, mitigating the rise in housing costs.

---the population density has increased steadily over the past several decades.

---the share of population under 18 is quite high, and may be the highest in the country.

---per-capita income belies the extent of poverty; there may be more poverty here than anywhere else in the country.

(That’s the city named for the Virgin Mary.)

We‚ll close by noting that the Japan Tramway Society cites decreasing population along streetcar lines, and a decreasing population of children, as factors in the traffic declines experienced by Japanese streetcar systems (Nippon no romendensha handbook 2001; English title Tramways of Japan STADTBAHN 16, Ninth Edition 2001. Tokyo: Japan Tramway Society, 2001.)



 
Details, Details (Wendell Cox is Not Mediocre, Just

From the Cabalmaster:

HE’S NOT MEDIOCRE -- HE’S JUST AVERAGE - III

The Secret Worldwide Transit Cabal has recently just found another example of “weak and lame” on a “Demographia” page: "Japan Cities, Ranked by 1990 and 1995 Population" (posted by The Cabalmaster, Master of All Transit-dom 9/05/2002 01:48:00 PM

Tuesday, September 03, 2002

 
TOKYO -- Tokyo Monorail (aka "Tokyo-Haneda") -- PART THREE (Monorail 16)

From the Cabalmaster:

We opinionated TransitCabalists are frankly skeptical of longtime claims that the Tokyo Monorail is "profitable." We accept this as true within the context of Japanese business practices -- but few would scramble to invest in a similar facility on this side of the Pacific.

Prior to the recent reorganization (below), the Monorail returned an operating surplus equal to 17 percent of revenue. Most of Japan's 15 "large" non-JR private-secor railways (i.e. those established prior to the breakup of the nationwide Japanese National Railway network) return "net profit" equal to 2-12 percent of revenue. These "net profit" ratios are, of course, lower than the ratios of operating surpluses to revenues.

However, the Tokyo Monorail had a rather small "capitalization" relative to the value of its facilities. In nominal terms, this amount represented 14 percent of the cost of building and equipping the line. If adjusted for inflation, this percentage would fall considerably. This suggested a substantial amount of liabilities, or debt -- which recent .

In addition: Tokyo Monorail Co, Ltd., exists as a separate corporation, all but stock is held by Hitachi Transportation Systems, Ltd. There are almost no other "private-sector" railways in Japan whose stock is held by a single investor. This suggested some degree of "supplier financing." (The Monorail accounts for less than one percent of the annual revenues of the parent enterprise, Hitachi, Ltd, the largest private-sector employer in Japan with about 320,000 staff members. See: www.asahi.com/english/business/K2002042300444.html.)

The "Japan Company Handbook," a semi-annual publication by Toyo Keizai Co, Ltd (see: www.toyokeizai.co.jp/english/jch), provides the following information:

". . . in Japan it is common to give and receive inter-corporate credit by means of notes."

"There are some company whose 'Shareholders' Equity' is a minus value. This signifies that the accumulated loss is so large that liabilities are in excess of assets. If the liabilities exceed assets for three years in a row and, moreover, if a dividend is not declared for five years, the company will be struck off the stock exchange."

We conclude that the Tokyo Monorail Co, Ltd, was in many respects a self-supporting "showcase" for Hitachi-Alweg technology. We doubt that many American investors -- other than monorail buffs -- would be interested in such a venture.

The new East Terminal building at Haneda Airport is planned for completion in 2003. This will be served by a 0.5-mile Monorail extension, and by the existing Keikyu station.

The East Japan Railway ("JR-East"), one of the privatized regional successors to the Japanese National Railways (JNR) network, announced in December 2001 that it would purchase the majority of Tokyo Monorail stock from Hitachi Transport Systems. (See: www.asahi.com/english/business/K2001122100439.html. See also: www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nb20011221a7.htm.)

JR-East was to purchase 70 percent of Tokyo Monorail stock for 7 billion yen (about $52 million). The remaining 30 percent was to be purchased by Hitachi, Ltd, parent of the Hitachi Group, for 3 billion yen (about $22 million). The decision to sell was prompted by high debt, and need for capital investment [renewal, perhaps?] that Hitachi was not eager to make.

At the end of 2001, the Monorail carried 140,000 passengers per day, down by 22 percent from that carried at 1997. Since completing its extension (or "re-extension") to Haneda Airport at the end of 1998, Keikyu has conducted aggressive marketing campaigns. Keikyu competition hurts JR-East as well as the Monorail, for 70-80 percent of Monorail passengers change to JR Yamanote Line trains at Hamamatsu-cho. The sale gives JR-East "access" to Haneda Airport.

We "opinionated ones" would say "control over its Haneda connection" is a more accurate description. The Monorail will continue to operate as a separate entity, although JR-East planned to revise the timetable to provide improved connections with Yamanote Line trains, and to sell discount tickets for trips to the airport.

We're also intrigued by other financial details. It looks to us like Hitachi Transportation Systems decided to unload the monorail. Liabilities (debt) were stated at 50 billion yen ($370 million). Compare this amount to the sale price -- 10 billion yen, about $75 million -- and the capitalization stated in a Japanese data book -- 3 billion yen, about $22 million. Note that the Hitachi, Ltd, "share" of the transaction is exactly the same as this "capitalization."

During the 2001 fiscal year, the Monorail earned 15.5 billion yen (almost $116 million) in revenues, and posted an operating profit of 3.05 billion yen (almost $23 million). But debt service reduced pretax profits to 150 million yen ($1.1 million).

We don't suppose that the neighborhood monorail buff wants you to ask: "If the Tokyo Monorail is so profitable, where did all that debt come from?"

Without attempting to adjust for inflation, the "nominal" construction cost of the original Tokyo Monorail line was 21.1 billion yen (20 million yen for infrastructure, 1.1 million for rolling stock). This is much more than the "capitalization" amount, 3 billion yen. It's obvious that a large share of the construction cost was paid with borrowed money, including most or all of the "infrastructure." The company's traffic rose by a factor of 20 between 1965 and 1997. That would have permitted debt financing of additional rolling stock (the line is now using its third generation of cars) and other improvements, steadily increasing the total amount of liabilities. One might call this the "amazon.com" approach.

The days of steadily increasing Monorail traffic have ended. The national economy is mired in recession, and there is little prospect for short-term improvement. The long-term future does not look promising, since various new rail lines are planned to reach Haneda. Hitachi no doubt felt the squeeze. Things might improve under JR-East control, owing to improved coordination with JR trains, promotion as part of the JR metropolitan rail network, and through-ticketing arrangements.

We opinionated TransitCabalists point out that prospects for additional expansion are virtually nil.

We acknowledge the fact that the Tokyo Monorail is the world's busiest airport "rail" link, and will certainly remain in operation far into the future.

However, there is little doubt that the Monrail will become less important, gradually but steadily, as Tokyo continues to expand its conventional rail systems.

It's true that the monorail is faster, and cheaper, for passengers traveling to and from Hamamatsu-cho. Travel time from the nearest subway station (Daimon) is 28 min, compared to 22 min by monorail, and the combined subway-Keikyu fare is about $5, compared to about $4 by monorail.

However, Hamamatsu-cho is not a major "destination." The Monorail's cost and time differences disappear for passengers continuing north to major destinations such as Shimbashi, just one minute north of Daimon by subway or (two minutes by JR Yamanote Line from Hamamatsu-cho). Through trains from the Keikyu network continue over subway tracks to major destinations such as Ginza and Asakusa, then by connecting railways to points as far as Narita Airport. Although there are no direct trains to points south, Keikyu provides convenient connections at Keikyu-Kamata station to Kawasaki, Yokohama and other destinations.

The Tokyo Monorail once planned extensions from Haneda to Yokohama (11 miles) and to Kamata (2.5 miles), but did not secure authority for these. The company relinquished its license to build northward from Hamamatsu-cho to Shimbashi in 1966. JR-East announced that it would study a Monorail extension to Shimbashi. This would provide better connections with various JR services, but would also be extremely expensive to build, and for this reason we doubt that this proposal will advance.

Additional rail services will reach Haneda within the next decade. A new subway line, paralleling the west side of the Yamanote loop to serve major centers such as Ikebukuro, Shinjuku and Shibuya is under construction, and is planned for completion by 2007. This will connect at Shibuya with the Tokyo Express Electric Railway, permitting regional through services from northwestern points to Kawasaki, Yokohama . . . and Kamata. A short connecting link to the Keikyu line is planned as a medium-term project. Through service to Haneda Airport would require either dual-gauge track (Keikyu uses standard gauge; the new subway will use 3'6" gauge) or perfection of "free-gauge" rolling stock that can pass between lines of different gauges while in motion. Long-term projects include passenger service on an underground freight bypass near Haneda Airport, and a new "middle-peripheral" rail line that will eventually reach Haneda. All of these projects will use conventional rail technology.